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Abstract 
Industrial relations are in flux in many nations, perhaps most notably in Germany and 
Britain. That said, comparatively little is known in any detail of the changing pattern of 
the institutions of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany and still 
less in both countries about firm transitions between these institutions over time. The 
present paper maps changes in the importance of the key institutions, 1998-2004, and 
explores the correlates of two-way transitions, using successive waves of the German 
IAB Establishment Panel and both cross-sectional and panel components of the British 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey. We identify the workplace correlates of the 
demise of collective bargaining in Britain and the erosion of sectoral bargaining in 
Germany, and identify the respective roles of behavioral and compositional change.  
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I.  Introduction 
In recent years there has been an ongoing process of decentralization in Germany with a 
decline in sectoral agreements (Flachentarifverträge). The formal erosion of these central 
wage agreements apart, the path toward decentralization is less transparent; for example, 
many companies still pay above the wages agreed to in regional and industry-level 
agreements, there is no obvious sign of a sustained growth in firm-level agreements 
(Firmentarifverträge), and many firms though not bound by collective agreements still  
orient themselves toward sectoral agreements. The German system of industrial relations 
continues to be characterized by its extensive juridification, framework of binding 
collective agreements, and encompassing interest organizations on both sides of the labor 
market. It is moreover a dual system of interest representation, of codetermination and 
collective bargaining. But although few would claim today that Germany’s basic 
industrial relations system remains intact (e.g. Klikauer, 2002), there is lingering 
ambiguity concerning the facts of the case – let alone their determinants – allowing for  
disagreement as to the consequences of the erosion that has been observed.1  
The British industrial relations system differs in a number of fundamental respects 
from its German counterpart. First, it remains a system in which employers are largely 
free to choose how they engage with employees and how they associate with one 
another.2 There are few formal requirements placed upon employers to negotiate, consult, 
or inform employees over employment relations matters. Those rules that do exist tend to 
originate at European level and have the greatest impact on transnational corporations.  
Second, certain auxiliary legislation that supported employees’ bargaining rights – such 
as that which extended the terms of bargaining agreements to uncovered workers in the 
public sector – were removed in the 1980s. As a result, there is very little statutory 
underpinning to collective bargaining and that which does exist – such as the statutory 
recognition procedure – is largely a dead-letter. Third, because of this framework, there is 
little necessity for employers to seek derogations from sectoral bargaining arrangements. 
And while it is possible under statute for employers to permit collective agreements to be 
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directly legally binding (via the 1992 Trade Unions and Labour Relations Consolidation 
Act)3 this does not happen in practice. Instead, collective agreements take legal effect as 
implied terms in employees’ contracts of employment.  Fourth, the peak social partners 
are relatively weak in Britain. Employer association membership is low and declining 
and employer associations have traditionally been very weak, with a few notable 
exceptions such as the Chemical Industries Association and the Engineering Employers’ 
Federation. As a consequence, there is little coordination in bargaining arrangements 
across employers, and bargaining coverage tends to be low. Even a quarter century ago, 
sectoral agreements were the principal method of pay determination in only one-sixth of 
private sector workplaces and they declined dramatically through to the late 1990s 
(Brown, Bryson, and Forth, 2009: 34). In short, sectoral bargaining was already a spent 
force in Britain by the time our analysis begins in 1998. Finally, because the system is 
highly decentralized, fragmented and uncoordinated, British unions tend to focus their 
organizing activity at workplace or organization level, rather than sectorally or nationally. 
Nor for that matter do they share responsibility for workplace governance issues with 
works councils. Rather, Britain has joint consultative committees (JCCs) which are 
voluntary structures usually set up at the behest of management and with little or no 
authority derived from statutory arrangements.4 Consequently, British unions seek to 
address the full range of workplace-related issues as they impinge upon the pay and 
conditions of employees. 
The goal of the present exercise is to update research on the facts of the case in 
both countries (even though we only cover the interval 1998-2004 because of our cross-
country focus), to chart transitions between collective bargaining states, and seek to 
account for the resulting collective bargaining structure. That is to say, we will first 
examine the course of collective bargaining (including the erosion of multiemployer 
bargaining and the expansion of sectors without collective bargaining) and worker 
representation (including works councils and Joint Consultative Committees) in greater 
detail than has previously been undertaken in any comparative study of Germany or 
Britain before turning to a descriptive examination of transitions between states over our 
common sample period and thence an analysis of their correlates and the 2004 status quo 
ante.  
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II.  Backdrop 
Historically, centralized bargaining (or, more accurately, regional industry-wide 
bargaining) has been the key form of collective bargaining in Germany, covering some 
90 percent of all employees. As Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006: 168) note, 
things first began to change in the early 1970s with the emergence of what they term 
“qualitative bargaining policy,” namely sectoral agreements that sought to accommodate 
improvements in working life and the protection of employees against dislocations 
caused by rationalization and technical change. Such provisions – first tackling changes 
in the organization of work and subsequently in the flexibility of working time – were to 
be implemented at local level. 
 Thence, in the 1990s, under the pressures of globalization, high unemployment, 
and unification, all aspects of the system of collective bargaining are widely 
characterized in the German literature as having being subject to more or less serious 
erosion if not actual crisis (e.g. Artus, 2001). Thus, employers were increasingly 
resigning from employers’ associations (Silvia and Schroeder, 2007), trade union strength 
was declining rapidly (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2007), and the coverage of 
collective bargaining was shrinking (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2001). Moreover, the 
coverage of that other pillar of the German dual system – the works council (see below) – 
was also subject to erosion (Hassel, 1999). 
But in response to these challenges German collective bargaining was 
decentralizing. In part, this took the form of a rising number of company agreements – 
which increased from 2,550 in 1990 to 6,415 in 2001 – as many firms dropped out of the 
centralized system. A more important and sustained tendency, however, has been the 
growth of decentralization in sectoral agreements through the device of ‘opening clauses’ 
(Öffnungklauseln) that have allowed firms more flexibility through locally-negotiated 
adjustments to centrally-agreed working time and wages (Bispinck, 2004). The former 
adjustments allowed increases or decreases in working time and alterations to work 
schedules. The latter permitted reductions in wages or a suspension/withdrawal of wage 
improvements and/or working time adjustments involving wage changes (Hassel, 1999: 
496-497). Of the two, agreements on working time reductions (without compensation) 
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were the more common (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2006). We note parenthetically that a 
nonretrospective question on such opt-out clauses was first asked in the dataset used here 
(the IAB Establishment Panel) in 2005, just outside the time frame of the present study. 
But given that opening clauses well preceded 2005 their potential influence will be 
accommodated using industry dummies, the maintained hypothesis being that they offer a 
means of stemming the erosion of centralized bargaining by better aligning outcomes to 
firm-specific needs  
To complicate matters, so-called plant-level “pacts for employment and 
competitiveness” (betriebliche Bündnisse für Arbeit [und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit]) have 
also proliferated in recent years (Berthold et al., 2003; Rehder, 2003). Such agreements 
have also led to more flexible work rules and working time as well as reductions in total 
compensation. Although partially guided by opening clauses, they apply to covered and 
uncovered companies alike. The consensus view appears to be that while opening clauses 
represent a trend to organized decentralization, pacts though no less a response to the 
economic condition of the firm, at least represent a different dynamic: a new normal 
regulatory instrument. At issue is the extent to which such agreements if not in actual 
contravention of sectoral labor contracts are in fact destabilizing (see Seifert and Massa-
Wirth, 2005). The point is that while concession bargaining of this type typically operates 
within the framework of sectoral agreements it may create pressures leading companies 
to leave the system altogether – which effects might be long delayed and not yet evident 
in data on the structure of bargaining (and certainly over the time interval examined 
here.) As a practical matter, our dataset contains retrospective information on pacts in the 
2006, 2008 and 2009 waves, although this information is not used here on grounds of 
consistency with the earlier question on opt-out clauses. As before, any influence of such 
institutional innovations is captured via industry dummies.  
Recently, employer associations have also responded to the challenge of 
membership losses via a new form of membership affiliation known as membership 
“without collective bargaining ties” (ohne Tarifbindung) (see Silvia and Schroeder, 2007: 
1453-1455). Such affiliations allow members to take advantage of the relevant 
association’s legal, lobbying, and personnel services without having to pay the 
contractual wage. By the same token, such members are not shielded from union efforts 
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to extract a local agreement and they cannot collect strike insurance benefits as can 
regular members. This new membership form is common in the metals, plastics, and 
woodworking industries and is popular among small firms. Silvia and Schroeder note that 
about one-quarter of member firms in metalworking (employing around 10 percent of 
workers in that sector) have this form of membership as well as some one-third of all 
firms in the textile employer associations where losses of membership have been most 
acute. Further, in eastern Germany the majority of members in many regional employer 
associations have this status. Such membership developments do of course fall squarely 
within our sample period but our data contain no information on their incidence. Once 
again, their effects will be recouped through industry dummies. 
Finally, mention might also be made of so-called “quick notice agreements.” 
German law requires any company leaving an employers’ association to adhere to all 
contracts signed by that association when the company was still a member for the 
duration of those contracts. Employer associations of late have begun to offer quick 
notice agreements that allow members to leave an association upon demand, even after a 
provisional agreement with the unions has been reached but prior to its authorization. 
Although quick notice may have alleviated some of the anxiety of nervous managers 
about being trapped in a bad contract, Silvia and Schroeder (2007: 1453) contend that it 
has not stopped the slide in sectoral agreements, arguing that those associations with such 
agreements do not seem to have declined noticeably slower than those without them; and 
further caution that the option has rarely been exercised.  
 In sum, after sharp falls in industry-wide bargaining (by the start of our sample 
period the number of employees covered by sectoral agreements had fallen to 68 (51) 
percent in western (eastern) Germany), recent innovations in collective bargaining may 
well have blunted further erosion in the number of establishments and workers covered 
by sectoral agreements and/or neutralized any trend toward increasing company 
bargaining proper. This is not to deny that the process of decentralization is ongoing. 
Indeed, the direct evidence is to the contrary. Thus, there are very few sectors where 
opening clauses have not been agreed upon. For example, as of 2005 around 13 percent 
of establishments in the IAB Establishment Panel covered by collective bargaining stated 
that their collective agreements contained opening clauses and about one-half of these 
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establishments had made use of them. Furthermore, pacts for employment have provided 
the basis for yet further decentralization: a 2003 survey of works councils indicated that 
such pacts were in existence at about 23 percent of German companies with at least 20 
employees (the proportion was much greater – at 46 percent –  in establishments with 
over 1,000 employees). The principal issue is whether this decentralization is planned or 
destabilizing. And even where not destabilizing the ability of the system to meet the 
needs of decentralization confronts the issue of workplace representation through the 
agency of the works council, that other pillar of the dual system of interest representation 
comprising unions and works councils.  
As we have seen, unified unions organize entire sectors and industries and 
negotiate industry-wide collective agreements. For their part, work councils are elected at 
plant level and represent the interests of all employees in the plant, not just union 
members. They enjoy relatively extensive powers, extending to codetermination rights, 
but not covering wage negotiations per se unless the bargaining parties at 
regional/industry level expressly cede them a role. That said, the wide-ranging influence 
of councils impart material de facto bargaining authority while over the course of time 
more conventional bargaining rights have accrued to them under both 
authorized/regulated and unauthorized decentralization. In other words, issues that were 
formerly dealt with only under collective bargaining are increasingly being addressed 
within the domain of works councils. At one level, then, works councils may be likened 
to Anglo-Saxon workplace unions even though the strike weapon is foreclosed to them. It 
follows that any discussion of collective bargaining necessitates analysis of the course of 
works council representation.  
 Any decline in works councils (and of the union movement as well given their 
symbiosis)5 limits the regulative capacity of German industrial relations institutions; in 
particular, the ability of the German system to decentralize may be threatened while 
further undermining trade unions. In the present treatment, we will consider the factors 
underpinning works council presence and works council formation/dissolution noted in 
the works council literature (see, for example, Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 1997; 
Addison et al., 2003; Addison et al, 2004; Jirjahn, 2009). We will also consider the role 
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of collective bargaining in this regard, although we do not here explore the union-works 
council nexus in any real detail.   
 The attitude of the unions is also a constraint since it is hard to conceive of the 
needs of decentralized bargaining being best served by a situation in which the 
bargaining parties at sectoral level can exercise a right of veto as is the case with opening 
clauses. Finally, we have to recognize that the influence of collective bargaining extends 
well beyond its formal competence or reach. This is because a very considerable number 
of uncovered establishments/employees are influenced by the wages set under sectoral 
agreements by virtue of the ‘orientation’ of their employers toward such agreements. 
Thus, our analysis must seek at least to document this behavior as distinct from the 
classical uncovered case. 
Despite the profound differences in the employment relations context charted 
earlier, the British private sector faces similar difficulties with respect to worker 
representation and collective bargaining as does Germany. Writing at the beginning of 
this decade, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000: 234), reflecting on the findings of a 
study tracking employment relations over the previous two decades, commented: “The 
system of collective relations, based on the shared values of the legitimacy of 
representation by independent trade unions and of joint regulation, crumbled … to such 
an extent that it no longer represents a dominant model.” Even where unions retained 
nominal bargaining rights, they were frequently overlooked in decision-making, and little 
or no negotiation over terms and conditions occurred. Commentators were to refer to 
unions as “hollow shells” (Hyman, 1997: 314; Millward, Bryson, and Forth, 2000: 
chapter 5; Brown et al., 1998). As a consequence, the financial state of British trade 
unions is parlous (Willman and Bryson, 2009), severely limiting their powers to service 
current members’ interests, let alone organize parts of the non-union sector. The tendency 
was therefore for new workplaces and new entrants to the labor force to be ‘born’ non-
union (Machin, 2000; Willman et al., 2007), resulting in a rise in the proportion of all 
employees in the labor force who had never been union members. This trend was even 
apparent in organized workplaces (Bryson and Gomez, 2005).   
Union organizational weakness has manifested itself in a decline in the union 
wage premium (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2009) and, despite a more benign political 
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climate under ‘New Labour,’ a widespread perception of union ineffectiveness among 
union members and non-members alike (Bryson, 2007; Bryson and Forth, 2009).  
Perhaps somewhat perversely, weaker unions may have been more attractive to 
employers as partners in organizational change and enhanced workplace performance.  
Union capacity to organize industrial action seems to have diminished (Dix, Sisson, and 
Forth, 2009), and with it the last vestiges of fear among employers with which unions 
were viewed in the aftermath of the 1979 Winter of Discontent and the Miners’ Strike of 
the early 1980s. There is indeed new evidence to suggest that employers do perceive 
unions as helpful in improving workplace performance (Bryson and Forth, 2009), and 
there has been a diminution in union negative effects on profitability – such that these 
effects are no longer statistically significant (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2009). However, 
employers have supplemented and, in some places, supplanted unions through the 
creation and widespread adoption of non-union forms of two-way communication 
offering employees ‘voice’ through non-union channels (Willman, Gomez, and Bryson, 
2009). Unlike the German case, where works councils provide a strong representative 
form of voice at the workplace for workers, British employers have placed the onus on 
direct communication mechanisms such as team briefings. Although they are the creation 
of employers, such mechanisms appear to enhance employee perceptions of managerial 
responsiveness to their needs and problems at the workplace (Bryson, 2004), potentially 
undermining the position of representative forms of worker voice such as trade unionism 
and joint consultative committees. (And, unlike works councils, it will be recalled that 
JCCs are voluntary rather than mandatory representative institutions, set up at the behest 
of management and not the workforce.)  
Britain differs from Germany in another important respect. Unlike German 
employers, their British counterparts are able to ‘mix and match’ pay bargaining 
strategies, including bargaining coverage at workplace, organization, and sectoral level.  
However, although employers are at liberty to deploy different levels of bargaining, in 
practice, if there is any collective bargaining at all, it tends to be at a single-level (Bryson 
and Wilkinson, 2002). Such single-level bargaining reflects a more general trend towards 
the simplification of pay determination at workplace level (Kersley et al., 2006: 184). 
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III.  Some Theoretical Reflections on Bargaining Structure 
Abstracting from macroeconomic considerations attendant upon the covariation of  
centralization (latterly, coordination) of the bargaining system and macro aggregates, 
centralized or at least more centralized wage agreements can be rationalized on a number 
of microeconomic grounds. The standard argument is that centralization creates 
homogeneous conditions for companies by taking the wage out of competition, providing 
comparable labor costs for all companies. More formally, transaction costs can be 
reduced by substituting collective negotiations for the plethora of individual bargains and 
through standardization of the terms and conditions of the employment relation. These 
savings in the costs of negotiation and regulation are said to be increasing in the degree of 
collective bargaining centralization and coverage. Further, as Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and 
Kohaut (2006:172) point out, the transaction cost arguments may be stiffened by recourse 
to power considerations. Thus, they refer to the advantages to the employer side of being 
able to pool their resources when dealing with organized labor. Most obviously, employer 
organizations are designed to counter whipsawing – the picking off of employers one at a 
time. 
That said, the attraction of decentralization is that single-employer agreements (or 
individual contracts) have the obvious advantage of allowing the parties to tailor the 
agreement to the situation of the company or plant.  Establishment-specific problems can 
then more easily be taken into account. But if unions are organized at a different level or 
insiders have the power to dictate wages and conditions then more centralized contracting 
may be beneficial, implying that there may be some optimal level of centralization.   
External developments intrude on this scenario. In particular, the heightened 
competition from globalization challenges existing structures and choices of the 
regulatory framework. Globalization increases the need for operational flexibility (i.e. 
differentiated responses) in response to changing conditions in product and factor 
markets – the notion of increased heterogeneity in production strategies and labor 
practices. In such circumstances, as Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut note (2006: 173), 
“… the transaction-cost advantage of centralized arrangements decreases in favor of the 
informational and flexibility advantages of decentralized regulation.” The requirements 
of flexible and local decision-making confront the relatively rigid rules set by collective 
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bargaining. One aspect of this is the widely observed employer withdrawal from 
employer associations, as well as the reticence of newly-founded firms to join them (on 
the facts of the latter, see Kohaut and Ellguth, 2008, who further document the general 
course of collective bargaining coverage between 1996 and 2007). . 
Much research has in fact been devoted to the effect of economic change on 
employer associations. For example, Traxler (2004) has considered the ability of 
employer associations to weather collective action problems in the face of unfavorable 
economic conditions. In a cross-country setting he reports that institutional factors (of 
which the most important is the extension of multiemployer agreements to those 
employers not affiliated to the signatory employer association) are more important than 
economic factors (such as foreign trade dependence) as determinants of the level of 
employer density. This ties in of course with the varieties-of-capitalism model. However, 
economic change requires adjustment strategies on the part of employer associations, and 
Traxler observes that the functional adjustments (e.g. political lobbying, mergers, cuts in 
budgets, services, and dues, reorientation toward product market interests) have 
weakened them in relation to their constituency – if not labor unions. Further, weakening 
of the core function of multiemployer bargaining threatens the withdrawal of government 
support (based on macroeconomic considerations) and at root the survival of employer 
associations. 
Traxler concludes importantly that supportive labor law has contained this risk by 
means of organized decentralization (see also Ochel, 2003, pp. 20-24). However, he 
cautions that the adjustment strategies followed by employer associations may exacerbate 
their problems in the long run while noting that decentralizing tendencies may become so 
dominant that multiemployer bargaining loses control of the process and ultimately fades 
away. A not dissimilar conclusion is offered in the very different treatment by Silvia and 
Schroeder (2009), who argue that the interests of large and small employers have 
diverged fundamentally since the mid-1980s with the attempt by the latter to shift the 
burden of adjustment to cost pressures on to the former, leading smaller employers to 
desert employer associations. The response of employer associations in the form of two-
tiered membership and like measures is an attempt to bridge the gap. Not only is this 
narrative inconsistent with the predictions of the varieties-of-capitalism model but, if a 
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tipping point has already been reached, it may also constitute support for the polar 
opposite position of the convergence (around an Anglo-Saxon model) thesis.  
  Finally, we have not mentioned the effect of transnational economic integration 
on unions. Two points are in order here. First, there is broad consensus that unions have 
been impacted harder by the economic changes detrimental to collective action. 
Heightened unemployment and growing internationalization, so the argument runs, have 
exacerbated pre-existing, pre-associational power asymmetries. Second, weakened 
unionism reduces the incentive to engage in multiemployer bargaining. Alternatively put, 
union decline strengthens the importance of the supportive role of labor law and provides 
the basis for Hassel’s (2002: 316) conjecture: “If it were not for such political support, 
the erosion of the German system of industrial relations would be even more rapid and 
more pronounced …” 
 And what of that other form or worker representation, the works council? 
Transaction costs may be important here as well since works councils might lower 
communications costs in larger and likely more complex and hierarchical organizations. 
But theoretical considerations have mostly focused on the works council-collective 
bargaining nexus. One idea is that where a works council is embedded in a collective 
bargaining arrangement, the tendency of the works council agency to engage in rent-
seeking behavior will be sharply constrained, leading it to concentrate on production 
rather than distribution issues. (Freeman and Lazear, 1995; Hübler and Jirjahn, 2003) 
Thus, employers may be members of an employers association/participate in sectoral 
bargaining so as to limit rent seeking by the works council and take advantage of the pro-
productive voice aspects of the entity. But works councils are elected by workers and not 
by management even if the latter can influence that decision (see section IV). And there 
are grounds for expecting a positive association between sectoral bargaining and works 
councils by reason of employee choice: works councils may need the support of unions to 
strategically shape outcomes (Wever, 1994). On the other hand, if they are seeking to 
extract rents, workers may see less value in voting in a works council in situations where 
there is a collective agreement in place. More generally, since works council rights are a 
function of employment size, workers should be less inclined to elect a council in smaller 
establishments.  
13 
A very different view of works councils is that they are defensive agencies, so 
that workers might elect them to protect quasi rents they have created through investing 
in firm-specific capital/training (Jirjahn, 2009). This time the opportunism is viewed as 
emanating from the employer side. Attention then shifts to the factors that might make 
employer opportunism more likely, such as transitory negative shocks and adverse 
economic situations more generally. On this view, works councils are likely to be 
introduced when workers anticipate a financial crisis. Arguments such as a poor sales 
situation might thus be included alongside other suspects reflecting heightened 
uncertainties (such as those associated with certain payment systems, research-based 
market strategies, and ownership forms that encourage employer risk taking). 
 
IV.  Empirical Studies 
There have been comparatively few cet. par. investigations of the structure of collective 
bargaining in Germany despite the extended debate on decentralization. We focus here on 
the set of studies of Schnabel and colleagues since these are among the best known in 
charting changes in the structure of collective bargaining while using the same data set as 
do we. Key arguments deployed in this series of studies and the related literature (on 
which, see the references contained in Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut, 2006) include 
establishment/organizational size, establishment type, establishment age, workforce 
characteristics, form of ownership, and (proxies for) the nature of the employer 
association. The relevance of establishment/organization size is that the transaction costs 
of concluding individual contracts may be reduced by collective bargaining which may 
also reduce complexity and improve communications. And if larger plants are more 
likely to be unionized, there are advantages in collective action that may be underscored 
by the orientation of the latter or at least by the collective good of wage moderation.6 For 
its part, branch plant status likely reflects spillover effects from the parent company 
favoring collective bargaining (vis-à-vis independent establishments of similar size) 
Perhaps the most important reason for the inclusion of establishment age is a 
mechanical one: the very persistence of bargaining structures. Further, younger plants 
may need more flexible institutional structures first to survive and then to grow. For its 
part, homogeneity of the workforce may point to greater benefits from the standardization 
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associated with centralization. Conversely, higher shares of (firm-specific) skilled 
workers may mean that solutions are best handled in house. That said, expectations might 
be reversed if the unskilled are less unionized or if lower skill levels limit the scope for 
opportunistic behavior and thence the need for collective regulation. Ownership of the 
company may be influential in a number of respects. In the first place, it is less likely that 
individually-owned businesses need follow a collective agreement on transaction cost 
grounds. Moreover, foreign-owned establishments may need to follow different 
institutional settings set from without. Finally, as our preceding discussion has suggested, 
the type of employers’ association may be important. In particular, associations offering 
opt-out clauses and more flexible forms of membership forms may stem membership 
losses. As a practical matter, however, lacking such information in regular data sets 
inferences have to be made on the basis of blunt industry dummies.   
With these preliminaries behind us, we next review studies by Schnabel, 
Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut (2006), and Kohaut and Schnabel (2001, 2003). Schnabel, 
Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut (2006) provide a comparative study of the determinants of 
bargaining structure in Britain and Germany in 1998 and 2000, respectively. Since they 
report that more or less the same set of variables in the two countries are associated with 
firms’ choice of governance structure, we will focus on their results for Germany here. 
The authors’ ordered probit results suggest that the probability of multiemployer 
bargaining rises with establishment size (especially in eastern Germany, where a 
doubling in employment size from 100 to 200 employees increases the probability of 
multiemployer bargaining by 6 percentage points), albeit at a decreasing rate. Branch 
plants are less likely to have no collective agreements and more likely to have multi-plant 
bargaining than are independent businesses. Newly-founded establishments are less likely 
to make use of multiemployer bargaining, while plants with larger shares of low-skilled 
workers are more likely to engage in multiemployer bargaining. Finally, foreign 
ownership has different effects in western and eastern Germany, increasing the 
probability of no collective bargaining in the former region and lowering it in the latter.       
Again using the IAB Establishment Panel, Kohaut and Schnabel (2001) provide a 
probit analysis of the determinants of applicability of a sectoral wage agreement, an 
ordered probit analysis of the applicability of contract type (where the dependent variable 
15 
is an index taking the value of 4 for a sectoral agreement, 3 for a firm agreement, 2 for no 
collective bargaining per se but where the firm orients itself to a (sectoral) collective 
agreement, and 0 where there is neither a collective agreement nor a process of 
orientation), and finally a probit analysis of the abandonment of a sectoral agreement. In 
each case the outcome year is 2000. The main results of the initial probit analysis is that 
the application of a sectoral agreement is positively associated with establishment size 
(although again at a decreasing rate), branch plant status, and (on this occasion) with the 
share of qualified workers, and negatively associated with the age of the establishment, 
its legal form (where it is an individually-owned firm), and foreign ownership (though 
not for eastern Germany). The factors that are associated with of a sectoral or 
multiemployer agreement presence assume opposite sign when it comes to their 
abandonment, although the effects are less well determined. In addition, firms are less 
prone to leave a sectoral agreement where a works council is present and where they 
already pay higher wages than laid down in that collective agreement. Finally, the 
authors’ ordered probit analysis suggests that formalization is more likely the larger the 
firm, among older and branch plants, and where the workforce is more qualified. Again 
as before, individually- and foreign-owned firms are less likely to apply (or refer to) 
contracts of any sort.  In their subsequent analysis of the application/abandonment of 
sectoral agreements, Kohaut and Schnabel (2003) obtain much the same set of results 
using data for 2001 and pooled data for 1998-2001. 
Two final studies by Schnabel and colleagues might usefully be addressed in 
conclusion. First, Kohaut and Schnabel (2006) examine the prevalence of opening 
clauses in sectoral agreements and the extent to which they are utilized by firms. Using 
data from the 2005 IAB Establishment Panel, the first to contain a question on such opt-
out clauses, the authors note that 13 percent of covered establishments stated that their 
sectoral agreements contained opening clauses. Interestingly, however, a much larger 
share of these establishments were unaware of whether or not the sectoral agreement 
contained any such clause(s). Subject to this caveat, approximately, one-half of the 
establishments used such clauses. In examining the determinants of the use of the two 
types of opening clauses – adjustments to working time and (less commonly) reductions 
in wages – Kohaut and Schnabel report that poor profitability of the enterprise is a key 
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initiator.7 The authors conclude that improved information about existing opening clauses 
as well as increases in their frequency might improve acceptance of the German system 
of collective bargaining and reduce the tendency of firms to withdraw from employer 
associations and hence sectoral bargaining.8   
In a separate study of contractual wage payments in excess of those fixed under 
sectoral bargaining (übertarifliche Entlohnung), Jung and Schnabel (2009) observe that 
40 percent of establishments covered by sectoral and firm-level agreements pay higher  
wages than are stipulated in the relevant agreement. Although their main concern is with 
the determinants of the wage cushion (and, ultimately for technical reasons, with its 
presence), our interest is mainly in their more descriptive findings. Jung and Schabel 
report that establishments covered by firm agreements are significantly less likely to have 
wage cushions. The argument is of course that wage cushions are necessary to overcome 
the restrictions imposed by centralized agreements, whereas firm-level agreements are 
tailored to firm-specific conditions. Next, it is reported that the incidence of wage 
cushions has declined in recent years, along with the coverage of collective agreements. 
Finally, the excess of wages over contractual levels has also declined – from 48 percent 
in 2000 to 43 percent in 2006. The authors’ interpretation is interesting: centralized 
bargaining has become more dominant to the extent that fewer firms deviated from the 
sectoral contract. 
 In the light of the above, it seems that there are grounds for anticipating a positive 
(negative) association between establishment size and age (foreign ownership) and 
formalization (i.e. collective bargaining, ignoring for the moment the distinction between 
single-firm and multiemployer agreements). There is some theoretical suggestion that a 
more homogenized and in particular less skilled labor force should be associated with 
collective bargaining, although this relation may be undercut/reversed by the insider 
behavior or unionization of more skilled groups. Single plants (as opposed to branch 
plants) may also on the basis of practical considerations and past research be expected to 
have less recourse to formalization and the same may be true of individually-owned 
enterprises although here there may be a positive association with works council 
formation on managerial pressure grounds.  
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 We include all such arguments and a range of others. First, we deploy a much 
wider range of workforce characteristics (shares of female workers, part-timers, and 
fixed-term contract workers, as well as skilled workers). This is partly because we are 
also interested in examining the determinants of (changes in) works council status.  But 
the use of atypical workers in particular may give plants an added degree of freedom and 
other things equal weaken the tendency to leave collective agreements. Similarly, 
expected increase in sales may give more room for maneuver. By the same token, they 
may also lessen the attraction of works councils to workers (see below). 
 Higher shares of exports in output, greater product market competition, R&D and 
advanced technology might all mirror the expected association between foreign 
ownership and collective bargaining. Differences in export propensity limit product 
commonalities and employment standardization needs of employers, heightened 
competition strengthens the importance of differentiated responses, while technological 
and structural change may further affect companies (and also occupational groups) 
differently and elevate the informational and flexibility advantages of decentralized 
regulation.  
The trend toward organizational change at the workplace – as manifested in a 
decentralization of decision making (delegation of responsibilities, introduction of team-
work and profit-centers) – might also be expected to require greater flexibility  than 
permitted by the rules set under centralized (strictly sectoral) bargaining, subject to the 
opt-out clauses mentioned earlier. Moreover, some or all of such measures may substitute 
for other forms of workplace representation and in particular the work council. 
Studies of the determinants of works council presence (and formation/dissolution) 
are altogether more numerous than for collective bargaining status (see, for example, the 
references contained in Jirjahn, 2009), not least since they also form part of the 
burgeoning literature of the effects of works councils on firm performance (reviewed 
extensively in Addison, 2009). Perhaps the main relation in the present context is that the 
entity is more likely to be observed in situations where the firm is covered by a collective 
agreement, irrespective of the form of the agreement with the growth of decentralized 
bargaining tendencies noted earlier. That is to say, works councils are not only 
responsible for the local administration of collective agreements but also have become 
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more involved in their negotiation in recent years. To this largely descriptive association, 
we can of course add the aforementioned predictions stemming from heightened 
uncertainty and directly proxied by, say, profit-sharing schemes and inversely proxied by 
expected improvements in sales. A recent paper by Mohrenweiser, Marginson, and 
Backes-Gellner (2009) takes the issue further than can we. This is because the authors 
have information from a unique data set on the extent to which the two sides – the 
workforce and plant management – are involved in the setting up of a works council. 
They report that although the former alone calls for the election of a works council in 
around two-thirds of the 60 companies that set up a works council between 2001 and 
2005, in the remaining one-third of cases management was actively involved in the 
process (e.g. by motivating workers to call for an election). Consistent with Jirjahn 
(2009), they report that the establishment of a works council is basically triggered by 
uncertainty on the part of the workforce as to the security of employment caused by 
organizational shocks and reflecting informational problems/asymmetries that can be 
tackled by the information and consultation rights of the works council. The motive is 
defensive: risk protection (or what Jirjahn terms ‘rent protection’). Where management is 
the triggering agent, it is argued that expected productivity improvement dominates 
potential rent distribution. At issue of course is whether the authors’ methodology 
establishes the primacy of rent protection over rent creation and the unexplored issue of 
works council dissolution. 
Finally, we note that any study of changes in the structure of German collective 
bargaining and worker representation should, for the reasons given earlier, control for 
industry affiliation. Similarly, it should also control for region, given the different trends 
in eastern and western Germany (namely, the more pronounced erosion of sectoral 
bargaining in the former region).  
Turning to Great Britain, the fragmented nature of the British industrial relations 
system means that the focus of empirical investigation has been workplace-level 
employment relations, facilitated by the publication of the Workplace Employment 
Relations Surveys where the unit of analysis is the workplace. The standard measure used 
to identify formal union bargaining rights has been union recognition, rather than 
collective bargaining coverage. Union recognition indicates whether a union is 
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“recognized by management for negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of the 
workforce in the establishment” – at workplace, organizational, or sectoral level. 
Although the two measures are conceptually very similar and highly correlated in 
practice, there has been some divergence in recent years and a growing proportion of 
workplaces with union recognition appear to have no active collective bargaining.  For 
many observers, this gap in the two measures, which we will return to below, is at least 
partly explained by the increasing inability of unions to get the employer to bargain over 
terms and conditions, even when a framework for such negotiation is in place (Brown et 
al., 1998).  In the absence of clear legal rules governing the enforcement of bargaining 
rights in Britain, unions have tended to rely on their bargaining power, traditionally 
proxied by the proportion of workers who are union members at the workplace (i.e. union 
density).  The latter magnitude continues to decline in the private sector, even if the pace 
of decline is not as rapid as it was in the 1980s and early 1990s. Measures of union 
strength used in the past –  such as separate bargaining arrangements in the face of multi-
unionism – have become so uncommon that they today are no longer the focus of 
attention, while others (such as closed shop arrangements) are no longer permitted under 
British law. Nevertheless, it would be quite misleading to assume that all unions are weak 
in British workplaces. Indeed, Millward, Bryson, and Forth (2000: chapter 5) show a 
bifurcation in union strength using measures of density, on-site lay representation, and 
collective bargaining coverage. Unions continue to influence outcomes such as wage 
setting, but only where the workplace has a high percentage of employees whose pay is 
set by collective bargaining (Millward and Forth, 2004). 
Although there are potentially important theoretical implications for firm 
performance having to do with the level at which bargaining occurs, their effects have 
rarely been tested in Britain of late due to the rapid decline of sectoral bargaining.9 The 
empirical literature on the determinants of different bargaining levels is also very sparse.  
Rather, the focus has been upon whether a workplace is unionized or not and, if so, how 
strong the union is at workplace level. 
The analysis of Schnabel, Zagelmayer, and Kohaut (2006), mentioned earlier, 
provides the only study of the correlates of collective bargaining arrangements in Britain 
and Germany, using workplace-level data.  Based on empirical analyses of the 1998 
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Workplace Employment Relations Survey and the 2000 IAB Establishment Panel, the 
authors argue that the correlates of bargaining arrangements are similar for both 
countries. They point to the significant role played by factors such as establishment size, 
single versus multi-plant organizations, foreign ownership, and establishment age. 
However, their analysis differs in a number of important respects from our own. First, 
their study covers the whole economy (public and private sectors together) whereas we 
focus on the private sector. Second, they provide ordered probit estimates on a 2000 
cross-section for three states: absence of bargaining, single-employer bargaining, and 
multi-employer or sectoral bargaining.  In contrast, we focus on probit and multinomial 
logistic estimates for the presence or otherwise of particular bargaining regimes and 
switching across regimes using panel data.  Third, our model specifications differ in a 
number of respects from theirs. For example, we incorporate lagged regime status in our 
panel models, JCC status, and variables capturing market competition. Finally, these 
authors’ models are unweighted whereas we use survey-weighted data. 
The most recent cet. par. investigation of the correlates of union recognition in the 
private sector is by Blanchflower and Bryson (2009).  In addition to sizeable differences 
in the probability of unionization by region and industry, factors independently correlated 
with higher union recognition probabilities in this study are firm and establishment size, 
domestic ownership, establishment age, and some features of workforce composition 
such as the manual/non-manual split (although this effect has diminished over time). 
Pooled analyses for the period 1980-2004 also show a strong independent time trend, 
with the probability of union recognition declining since the early 1980s. Others have 
shown that this cohort effect may date back to the early post-war period (Millward, 
Bryson, and Forth (2009: 55-56) go on to calculate that two-thirds of the decline in 
private sector union recognition is within-group and thus is more akin to a preference on 
the part of employers (conditional on their observable characteristics) rather than being 
accounted for by compositional change in the population of British workplaces. 
Brown, Bryson, and Forth (2009: 26-31) undertake a similar analysis, but this 
time focusing on the incidence of (any workers being covered by) collective bargaining at 
the workplace. But their results are similar: the probability of collective bargaining is 
higher among larger and older establishments and in multi-plant and larger firms. They 
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uncover similar time trends as well. They also present clear evidence of workforce 
composition effects, collective bargaining coverage being less likely in workplaces with a 
higher share of female workers and a greater proportion of non-manual workers. 
However, the main thrust of their analysis relates to the pervasive influence of product 
market competition. They show that increasing product market competition has played a 
critical role in undermining collective bargaining arrangements, with employers 
increasingly resorting to unilateral pay setting at the organization or workplace level. 
 
V.  Data 
The German data used in this inquiry are taken from the IAB Establishment Panel. The 
Panel is based on a stratified random sample of the plants10 – the strata are currently 
defined over 17 industries and 10 employment size categories – from the population of all 
establishments with at least one employee covered by social insurance (see Fischer et al., 
2009). The basis for sampling is the Federal Employment Agency establishment file, 
containing some 2 million establishments. The panel was set up in 1993 for western 
Germany so as to provide a representative information system permitting continuous 
analysis of labor demand. It was applied to eastern Germany in 1996 and is therefore now 
nationwide in its coverage. From the outset the IAB Establishment panel was intended as 
a longitudinal survey, so that a large majority of the same plants are interviewed each 
year. To correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly founded firms, however, the data 
are augmented regularly. Taken in conjunction with other extension samples (to allow 
regional analysis at the federal state level), the panel has grown over time and now the 
number of plants surveyed is around 16,000 units. 
The panel questionnaire consists of a set of questions that are asked in identical 
form each year. Such questions cover employment development, business policy, 
vocational training, personnel structure/movements, investment, wages and salaries, and 
adherence to collective agreements. Since 2007 these basic subject ‘blocs’ have been 
augmented by questions on further training, innovation, and working time. And at regular 
three-year (now two-year) intervals, the basic indicators are regularly supplemented by 
additional questions on such things as public funding. In addition to these fixed and 
quasi-fixed elements, other varying ‘current focus’ subjects are included every year. 
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These have included questions on the demand for qualified employees and the 
employment of older workers and the cooperativeness or otherwise of the works council. 
Finally, the survey is conducted in mid year and as a result some questions – on annual 
sales, investment, and the profit situations – are asked retrospectively in the following 
year’s survey. 
 In the present study we restrict the German data to the period from 1998 to 2004 
to maintain correspondence with the British WERS98. Over this entire period the 
German raw sample contains a total of some 95,375 observations. The following filters 
were applied to provide a sample of seven cross sections that are comparable to the final 
estimation samples. The filters were as follows (with the number of observations lost in 
applying each being given in parenthesis): selection of industries (15,560); selection of 
plants employing at least 5 employees (13,688), excision of public corporations (1,133); 
excision of plants where information on sales is not provided (6,967); and excision of 
plants where information on either collective agreement status or works council status is 
missing (4,892). Most of our descriptive results for Germany, therefore, are based on a 
total number of 53,135 observations, or approximately 7,600 observations a year on 
average.11 
In a second step, this sample is reduced to establishments that are observed in 
1998 and 2004 (but not necessarily in any or all intermediate years) to provide a final 
estimation sample similar to the WERS98. This estimation sample will be referred to as 
the incomplete panel case, and contains 1,747 establishments or 3,494 observations. We 
will also deploy a smaller sample made up of 1,060 establishments comprising those 
plants for which we have information in every single year of the sample period 1998 to 
2004. This will be referred to as the complete panel case.  
 Prior to presenting the descriptive statistics, some additional comments on the 
data set should be noted. First, we also used the 1993 and 2005 waves to check responses 
to the collective bargaining (and works council) status questions. Given inertia, plants 
that responded to the status question(s) as either yes-no-yes or no-yes-no in the three 
years 1997/99 and 2003/05 were treated as yes-yes-yes and no-no-no, respectively, 
involving some recoding of the beginning and end-of-period responses. Second, changes 
in industrial classification in 1999 do not cause any problems for us because of the design 
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of the present study. Thus, for the descriptive analyses, the cross sections are reduced to 
the same set of industries using the corresponding classification provided each year, 
whereas our estimations are in most cases based on data for 1998 and hence are 
unaffected by changes in industrial classification. Moreover, our estimations are based on 
the plants being observed in both 1998 and 2004, so that the classification for 1998 can 
be used, assuming establishments do not change industry. Third, we use weighted data 
throughout. The inverse of the selection probability is used for cross-section weighting. 
Due to the nature of the weighting process, it is generally the case that an establishment is 
allocated different weighting factors in any two subsequent waves.12 Definition of the 
variables used and descriptive statistics are provided in Appendix Table 1. 
Our British analysis deploys three data sets. These are the Workplace 
Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) of 1998 and 2004, which are cross-sectional 
surveys of workplaces and their employees, and the 1998-2004 Panel.  The latter is based 
on a stratified random subsample of the 1998 WERS cross-section that was followed up 
in 2004. That follow-up consisted of a dedicated panel survey which was considerably 
shorter than the 1998 survey interview.  This asymmetry in data collection means that 
pooled analyses of the 1998 and 2004 Panel data draw on a more restricted set of data 
items than those analyses which seek to predict 2004 outcomes with 1998 covariates. 
Our empirical analysis is confined to private sector workplaces with 10 or more 
employees, since this was the lower employment threshold for inclusion in the 1998 
survey.  The unweighted sample is 587 workplaces, though some cases are dropped in the 
analysis because they have missing information on one or more key data items. 
Throughout our analyses are weighted with survey sampling weights that account for the 
probability of sample selection (which in WERS is a function of establishment size and 
industry).  The population sampling frame from which the surveys are drawn is the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR).13 
Unlike the IAB Establishment Data, in the British case we only observe 
workplaces at two points in time, namely, 1998 and 2004. Thus the data offer ‘snapshots’ 
of those workplaces at two points in time, although there is a small amount of 
retrospective questioning about what has happened in the intervening years. Our data 
structure allows us to identify three types of workplace. First, there are those that 
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survived throughout the period 1998-2004 and had at least 10 employees at the beginning 
and the end of the period, since this is the sampling threshold for inclusion in the 1998 
survey. We call these units ‘stayers.’ All the Panel workplaces are, by definition, stayers 
but we can also use information on age of establishment and establishment size to 
identify stayers in both cross-sections. Second, we can identify ‘joiners,’ that is, those 
new workplaces born since 1998 together with those that grew above the 10 employee 
threshold since 1998. The third group is ‘leavers,’ consisting of workplaces that were 
present in 1998 but had either died by 2004 or else had shrunk below the 10 employee 
threshold. We use these data in combination to establish the role played by behavioral 
change among stayers on the one hand and compositional change arising from the 
differential incidence of bargaining practices among leavers and joiners on the other. In 
order to accomplish this we must rely on definitions of union recognition, collective 
bargaining and joint consultative committees (JCCs) that are consistently measured in 
both the two cross-sections and the Panel. This is relatively unproblematic in the case of 
union recognition and JCCs.  However, WERS collects bargaining coverage data in a 
number of ways. We use measures available for the two cross-sections and the Panel. The 
collective bargaining measure identifies whether a workplace determines pay for any of 
its occupational groups using collective bargaining, either through multiemployer, 
organization-level, or workplace-level bargaining. The manager responsible for human 
resources is asked to identify which of eight methods are used to determine pay for the 
single-digit occupations at the workplace. The first three codes relate to sectoral, 
organizational and workplace-level bargaining, respectively. The reasons for relying on 
this measure are two-fold.  First, it is the only consistent measure of collective bargaining 
across the two cross-sections and the Panel.  Second, it is the only measure which permits 
us to distinguish between coverage at workplace, organization, and sectoral level. 
However, the downside is that it understates the level of collective bargaining relative to 
measures that also incorporate other WERS data items.14 Definition of the variables used 
and descriptive statistics for the British case are provided in Appendix Table 2. 
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VI.  Findings 
(a) Germany 
Weighted data on the evolution of collective bargaining and worker representation – 
sectoral agreements, firm agreements, no agreements, and works councils – are provided 
in Appendix Table 3.  Figures 1 and 2 present the material in a more digestible form for 
establishment and worker coverage, respectively. Beginning with collective agreements, 
it is clear from Figure 1 that employer coverage by sectoral agreements declined 
materially over the sample period: from 48.9 percent to 40.4 percent coverage. On the 
other hand, the coverage of firm agreements among employers was more stable, declining 
from 4.8 percent in 1998 to 2.8 percent in 2004, with most of that decline occurring after 
the first year. Corresponding to the decline in sectoral bargaining was a marked increase 
in the number of firms without any collective agreements. These rose from 46.2 percent 
in 1998 to 56.8 percent in 2004. For their part, the share of firms with works councils 
showed considerable inertia, generally exceeding 9 percent over the sample period. 
(Figures 1 and 2 near here) 
Figure 2 looks at corresponding changes in the shares of covered and uncovered 
employees. Beginning again with sectoral bargaining, the recorded fall in the share of 
covered workers was from 62 percent to 53.8 percent, somewhat less than in the case of 
establishment coverage. Imperceptible falls were recorded for firm agreements (8.6 
percent to 8.0 percent). Correspondingly, the number of workers uncovered by either type 
of collective agreement duly rose from 29.3 to 38.2 percent. Again, works councils 
coverage displayed considerable stability, although a small overall decline from 45.3 to 
43.7 percent was observed. 
Two further points are in order. First, as regards the collective bargaining-works 
council nexus, declines in sectoral agreement coverage among establishments with works 
councils were no less pronounced than among establishments without works councils. 
For example, sectoral agreement coverage of employees was 77.3 percent in 1998 in 
works council establishments and 49.4 percent in their works council free counterparts; 
by 2004 these figures had fallen to 69.2 and 41.9 percent, respectively. Similar declines 
were observed in the sectoral agreement coverage of establishments in the two regimes. 
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Accordingly, there is nothing really to suggest that coverage in either case held up better 
in the presence of workplace representation.  
Second, there are those German plants that although they do not have collective 
bargaining nonetheless orient themselves towards a collective agreement (The following 
question is asked of those not bound by a collective agreement: “Are you [nonetheless] 
acting upon an industry-wide agreement?”) This raises the possibility that a decline in 
collective bargaining might have been counteracted by an increase in the number of firms 
orienting themselves towards such framework agreements. As a practical matter, we 
discover that the share of all employers (employees in establishments) that did not orient 
themselves towards a collective agreement rose between 1999 (the first year for which 
data were available) and 2004 from 25.4 (15.2) to 29.2 (18.7) percent. Over the same 
interval, the share of all employees (establishments) that did orient rose more slowly from 
21.9 (15.5) percent to 25.1 (17.8) percent. In other words, there was some relative fall in 
orientation among the steadily increasing numbers of plants and employees not covered 
by collectively bargaining (see Appendix Table 4)  
(Figures 3 and 4 near here) 
The next question that arises is whether the decline in collective bargaining is 
observed throughout or is instead a compositional phenomenon, with different behavior 
being recorded by stayers, joiners, and leavers. To examine this question we first examine 
changes in the status of those establishments that remained in the panel throughout, the 
‘stayers.’ Figure 3 presents weighted data for these stayers, based on the information 
supplied in Appendix Table 5. As can be seen, the broad trends evident in Figure 1 are 
replicated in Figure 3. Beginning with sectoral agreements, establishment coverage rates 
declined from 55.2 percent to 47.1 percent, while establishments without collective 
agreements grew from 40.4 percent to 47.7 percent of the total. There were even modest 
increases in the share of establishments with works councils (from 9.8 percent to 13.2 
percent) and with firm-level collective agreements (from 4.5 percent in 1998 to 5.2 
percent on 2004, albeit with several reversals). Figure 4 which describes the situation 
from the perspective of employment shares reveals a more muted picture of sectoral 
bargaining decline and uncovered sector growth, but more marked works council growth. 
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At the same time, based on the data supplied in Appendix Table 6, it can be seen 
that, among entrants to the panel, which may be recently-founded establishments or 
plants sampled for the first time, establishment (employment) coverage by sectoral 
agreement fell from 50.4 (61.9) percent in 1998 to 31.6 (53.4) percent while the share of 
uncovered plants (employment) rose from 45.5 (29.3) percent to 64.9 (38.6) percent. 
Among ‘exits,’ comprising plants that had closed and nonrespondents, the corresponding 
values were (from 1999; see Notes to Appendix Table 7) 50.7 (56.5) to 38.2 (51.0) 
percent and 46.1 (31.5) to 59.8 (40.0) percent. In short, while the basic trends in respect 
of sectoral agreements and the zero collective bargaining zone point to a general decline 
in the importance of framework agreements the tendencies are much stronger among 
entrants and exits than stayers. Finally, as far as works councils are concerned inertia is 
the order of the day with little to choose between stayers, leavers, and entrants.     
(Table 1 near here) 
 Let us next consider transitions into and out of collective bargaining and 
workplace representation as between 1998 and 2004. Table 1 summarizes such 
movements with separate results for the complete and incomplete panels. It will be 
recalled that for the former or balanced panel one has information on each and every year 
of the eight years whereas in the case of the latter panel information on one or more of 
the intermediate years is missing. Beginning with works councils, we observe that just 
3.7 percent of all firms changed their works council affiliation among the incomplete 
panel. (These comprised the 1.83 percent of firms that had no councils in 1998 and 23.04 
percent of the much smaller number of firms with councils in 1998.) Similar magnitudes 
are reported for the balanced panel. 
Somewhat less evidence of persistence is reported in the case of collective 
agreements of any type. Now almost 20 percent of firms in the incomplete panel and 
slightly less than that in the balanced panel changed their collective bargaining status. 
This reflects changes in industry-level agreements shown in the next two columns of the 
table. In the case of the incomplete panel a little over 20 percent changed their sectoral 
agreement status (made up of the more than one in ten firms without collective 
agreements in 1998 that had entered framework agreements by 2004 and the more than 
one-quarter that had left such arrangements). Although the latter percentage was much 
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the same as observed for works councils, note the very much larger sample of firms in 
both categories. Again there are minor differences between the balanced and incomplete 
panels.  
Transitions into and out of firm level collective agreements tell a very different 
story. Overall, there were fewer transitions than in the case of works councils. Less than 4 
percent of firms introduced or exited such arrangements, but of those firms with firm-
level agreements in 1998 more than one-half had abandoned them by 2004. Not 
surprisingly in view of the numbers the huge majority of firms did not change their status. 
Again, more firms exited collective agreements than entered them. 
  
(Table 2 near here) 
The results of trying to explain collective bargaining of any type using pooled 
data for the two years 1998 and 2004 are given in the first column of Table 2, again using 
weighted data. Our probit estimates suggest that larger and older plants, plants with 
works councils, plants that have recently delegated decision making authority, and plants 
located in Western Germany are all more likely to have collective agreements. 
Conversely, establishments having a greater export share and a higher proportion of 
workers on fixed-term contracts are less likely to be covered by collective bargaining.15  
The second and third columns of the table disaggregate by sectoral and firm-level 
collective bargaining, respectively. With one exception – the foreign property variable – 
the findings reported for sectoral bargaining mirror those presented for any collective 
bargaining, although there are of course differences in the precision of the estimates. But 
only the works council result carries over in the case of firm-level collective bargaining 
shown in the last column of the table. Note the oppositely signed coefficient estimate for 
export share, foreign ownership, and region observed in the case of firm-level collective 
agreements. Evidently, the determinants of sectoral and firm-level collective bargaining 
differ materially. 
(Table 3 near here)  
Attention shifts in our second set of regressions, contained in Table 3, to the 
prediction of end-period collective bargaining status based on beginning-period values of 
the covariates. All regressions include a lagged dependent variable to capture the 
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persistence indicated in our transitions analysis, and partly for this reason the good fit 
obtained is not unexpected. The results for collective bargaining of all types, reported in 
the first column, of the table show that there are five statistically significant positive 
coefficient estimates in addition to the lagged dependent variable. Thus, greater 
establishment size, usage of advanced technology, delegation of authority to lower levels 
in the organization, a larger share of female workers and location in western Germany are 
all associated with an increased likelihood of observing a collective agreement in 2004.  
On the other hand, introduction of profit centers and the share of part-time workers 
detract (marginally) from collective bargaining.  
As before, the findings for the two types of collective bargaining are sharply 
differentiated. From the second column of the table it can be seen that, apart from the 
persistence argument, establishment size, high-tech usage, single establishments, the 
proportions of skilled and female workers, and west German location are all associated 
with observing sectoral bargaining in 2004. For their part, the R&D and part-time worker 
variables are negatively correlated with sectoral bargaining. Finally, for firm-level 
agreements, the results given in the last column of the table suggest that expected 
increases in sales, advanced technology, single plant status, and location in western 
Germany are all less likely to promote such agreements. But export orientation, R&D 
activity, delegation of authority, works council presence, and greater competition are now 
associated with an increased probability of observing such agreements.  
(Table 4 near here) 
This leads us to the most interesting material of all dealing with the explanation of 
transitions. The results given in the first column of Table 4 consider collective bargaining 
status of any type in 2004 conditional on an absence of collective bargaining in 1998. We 
see that ‘joining’ is more likely the larger is the plant, the more advanced its technology, 
the higher the skills of its workforce (and the share of female workers), and also where 
the establishment is foreign owned, a single plant, has delegated decision-making 
authority, and is located in Western Germany. It is less likely when sales are expected to 
increase, when competition is acute, and where the plant was set up before 1990. The 
second column of the table considers the likelihood of leaving a collective agreement of 
any type. As can be seen, while the large majority of the coefficient estimates are indeed 
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negative just three – increased sales, advanced technology, and location in western 
Germany – are statistically significant at conventional levels. The share of part-time 
workers is the sole statistically significant positive coefficient. Clearly, the specific 
characteristics identified in this equation other than the industry dummies are providing 
few insights into the special circumstances of leavers. 
The findings in the third column of Table 4 pertain to the determinants of sectoral 
bargaining status in 2004 conditional on there being no such agreement in place in 1998. 
Joining a sectoral collective agreement is more likely for larger establishments, high-tech 
firms, single plants, firms with greater shares of female and fixed-term contract workers, 
foreign-owned enterprises, among those located in western Germany, and in situations 
where some delegation of decision making has been initiated. Joining a sectoral 
agreement is less likely among the firmament of older firms and those with greater export 
orientation, and also in circumstances where sales are expected to increase. As before, we 
gain few insights into the process of leaving sectoral agreements from this set of 
correlates. 
The last two columns of the table consider joining and leaving firm-level 
collective agreements. Joiners are more likely to be those plants with a higher export 
share, having a works council, confronting greater product market competition, and 
engaging in a delegation of tasks. On the other hand, joining is less likely where sales are 
expected to increase, among high-tech and single-establishment firms, and where the 
plant is located in western Germany. And from the last column of the table, abandoning 
firm-level bargaining is more likely when sales are expected to increase, and where there 
is a higher proportion of fixed-term contract and female workers. Further, leaving is also 
more common among both high-tech and older firms. It is less likely for larger firms, for 
firms practicing R&D, and for those with a higher share of part-time workers, practicing 
profit sharing, and confronting greater competition. 
 (Table 5 near here)  
Finally, Table 5 focuses on changes in works council status, namely, on works 
council joiners and leavers. First, consider the class of joiners. It can be seen that larger 
and foreign-owned plants, plus those with advanced technology, registering R&D 
activity, and having higher shares of female workers are all more likely to introduce 
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works councils, as indeed are those with firm-level agreements. But note that 
establishments that have introduced team-work, those expecting increased sales, and 
those individually owned are all less likely to set up works councils. These results 
provide very mixed support for the literature.  
And what of the leavers? We find that plants covered by sectoral collective 
bargaining evince a lower tendency to abandon works councils as do larger firms, firms 
expecting increased sales, older firms, foreign-owned firms, as well as firms registering 
R&D activity, a higher proportion of skilled workers, foreign owned and confronting 
higher competition in the market. But high-tech establishments, single plants, 
individually-owned plants, and those with devolved decision-making, recently introduced 
profit centers, and a higher proportion of fixed-term contract workers are all associated 
with a higher probability of abandoning works councils which evidence is perhaps more 
consistent with past research (e.g. Addison, Bellmann, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2003).  
 
(b) Great Britain 
Table 6 compares the incidence of our five measures of worker representation and 
collective bargaining in the 1998 and 2004 WERS cross-sections. A number of things are 
immediately apparent. First, unionization – whether measured in terms of union 
recognition or the incidence of collective bargaining – is considerably lower in Britain 
than in Germany throughout the period. Even at the beginning of the period, only one-in-
five private sector workplaces recognized unions for pay bargaining. Second, in contrast 
to Germany, where pay bargaining does occur, it is more likely to occur at firm-level than 
at sectoral level: it was twice as likely to do so in 1998, and three-and-a-half times more 
likely to do so at the end of the period.  (Although, as noted earlier, employers are free to 
combine sectoral and firm-level bargaining, fewer than 1 percent of workplaces do so.) 
Third, as in Germany, the chief indicators of collective bargaining are in decline. The 
percentage of workplaces with a recognized union fell by one-quarter over the period, 
while collective bargaining coverage fell by over one-third so that, at the end of the 
period, only one-in-ten private sector workplaces used collective bargaining to set pay for 
at least some of their employees. This decline was particularly evident in workplaces with 
sectoral agreements. Fourth, the incidence of collective bargaining coverage is well 
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below the incidence of union recognition throughout the period, a finding consistent with 
earlier studies showing an absence of active collective bargaining among many 
establishments even when they have a formal negotiating framework in place. 
(Table 6 near here) 
In the last column of Table 6 we turn to the incidence of JCCs, the closest analog 
to works councils in Germany. As noted earlier, our JCC definition is confined to 
committees which tackle multiple issues. We present figures for two definitions of JCC 
presence. The first definition includes JCCs at both workplace level and those at the level 
of an organization in multi-site firms.  Over a third of private sector establishments had 
such a JCC in 1998, but their incidence fell by one-fifth over the sample period. The 
figures in parentheses are confined to workplace-level JCCs. Around 15 percent of 
private sector workplaces had a JCC in 1998, but this figure fell by one-third by 2004 to 
just below 10 percent – a figure which is similar to the incidence of Betriebsräte in the 
German data. 
(Table 7 near here)  
Table 7 presents similar data but this time using employee weights to obtain the 
employee coverage of these institutions. In all cases the percentages are substantially 
higher than in Table 6 because these institutions of worker representation and collective 
bargaining are concentrated in the larger workplaces that account for a higher share of all 
employees.  For example, in 1998 one-fifth of workplaces recognised a union for pay 
bargaining but these accounted for almost two-fifths of employees. Similarly, almost half 
of all employees work in a firm with a JCC, though closer to a third have one at their own 
workplace.   
The collective bargaining figures are constructed in a slightly different fashion to 
those presented in Table 6. Rather than simply reweighting the workplace incidence of 
collective bargaining by the proportion of employees in those workplaces, the figures 
shown in Table 7 ensure that uncovered employees in workplaces with a collective 
agreement are not counted among the covered employees.16 That is they represent the 
actual coverage of collective bargaining We see that this magnitude falls from around 
one-quarter to one-fifth over the period, with the vast majority of those workers covered 
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by firm-level agreements. However, the percentage covered by firm level agreements has 
fallen quite dramatically. 
(Table 8 near here) 
Table 8 considers change in workplace representation and bargaining structures 
among ‘stayers,’ ‘leavers’ and ‘joiners,’ respectively, offering insights as to how much of 
the net change described above is driven by behavioral change among stayers, and how 
much of it arises from compositional change in workplaces as some of them shrink or die 
(‘leavers’) while others grow or are new-born (‘joiners’). In each case, we show the 
incidence of arrangements in 1998 and 2004 and the percentage point difference over the 
period. Beginning with union recognition, its decline over the period appears to be driven 
by compositional change: the rate of union recognition was two-and-a-half times greater 
among leavers in 1998 than it was among the joiners in 2004 (19 percent versus 8 
percent). In contrast, there was relative stability in the rate of union recognition among 
stayers, although it is notable that the recognition rate in the panel rises a little whereas it 
falls a little among the stayers in the cross-section. A very similar picture emerges 
regarding change in the incidence of collective bargaining. Compared with joiners, 
leavers are roughly twice as likely to have pay set by collective bargaining.  Among 
stayers, change is less pronounced.  
The situation is more mixed in the case of JCCs. There is little difference in the 
use of JCCs among joiners and leavers, whereas there has been a substantial decline in 
their use among stayers in the cross-sectional data. However, the picture of decline is not 
replicated in the panel. If we turn our attention to workplace-level JCCs, clearer 
indications of decline emerge when comparing joiners and leavers (and among stayers), 
in the cross-sectional data. Once again, however, there is greater stability in the Panel. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that compositional change in the population of 
workplaces is playing a greater role than behavioral change among stayers in the decline 
of collective bargaining and in those institutions which represent workers.  Nevertheless, 
in quantifying the overall effects of these changes induced by the behavior of stayers, 
joiners, and leavers, one needs to bear in mind that stayers constitute around two-thirds of 
all workplaces in the cross-sectional data so that their contribution to change is 
correspondingly large.17 
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(Table 9 near here) 
Table 9 focuses on regime switching among panel workplaces by focusing on 
their union, collective bargaining, and JCC status at the time of the surveys in 1998 and 
2004. The amount of net change shown gives only a partial understanding of behavioral 
change among these workplaces because it fails to capture the degree to which 
workplaces either introduce or abolish mechanisms for worker representation and 
collective bargaining.  Union recognition is the most stable of the measures: only 6.5 
percent of panel workplaces switch union status with new recognitions being a little more 
common than union de-recognitions. This finding is corroborated by retrospective 
questions asked in the 2004 panel survey indicating that 2.8 percent of workplaces 
claimed to have recognized unions since 1998, whereas fewer than 1 percent said they 
had derecognised a union.18 
Collective bargaining status is much less stable than union recognition status: 
around one-fifth of panel workplaces switch in or out of collective bargaining. This may 
reflect the fact that respondents only identify collective bargaining coverage when there 
is active collective bargaining going on, whereas union recognition indicates the 
framework within which negotiation may take place. Alternatively, there could be more 
measurement error in collective bargaining status if employer respondents find it a more 
difficult concept to comprehend. The amount of switching that occurs corresponds 
roughly with that in the German panel, perhaps lending credence to the idea that the 
figures are not driven by measurement error. However, in the German case, abolitions far 
outway introductions of collective bargaining, largely due to movement out of sectoral 
agreements. In the British case, movements into sectoral collective bargaining marginally 
outweigh exits but the key difference resides in the levels of bargaining incidence. 
Compared with Germany, coverage by sectoral bargaining agreements is uncommon in 
Britain’s panel workplaces. 
The least stable of our measures is JCC status: one-third of panel workplaces 
belonged to a firm that had either introduced or abolished a JCC over the course of our 
study.  However, this percentage falls to one-fifth in the case of workplace-level JCCs, a 
rate of switching which is similar to that for ‘any collective bargaining’ coverage. These 
figures are markedly different from those presented for German works councils in two 
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respects. First, JCCs are much more common than works councils. Second, switchers 
outnumber those who retain workplace JCCs by a ratio to 3:2. In Germany by contrast, 
works council switchers are outnumbered by those who retain a council throughout, 
perhaps reflecting the greater transaction costs involved in changing arrangements when 
they are underpinned by statute. 
(Table 10 near here) 
We now turn to the determinants of collective bargaining and workplace 
representation. We begin in Table 10 with parsimonious probit estimation of the 
correlates of union recognition and collective bargaining status in models that pool the 
workplace observations in 1998 and 2004. The outcomes of interest are union 
recognition, any collective bargaining, sectoral bargaining, and firm-level bargaining. 
The models perform reasonably well, accounting for between one-fifth and one-third of 
the variance in the unionization outcomes, although few effects are significant across all 
four measures. Union recognition and collective bargaining are more likely in larger 
establishments, the latter association being driven by an association with firm-level 
collective bargaining. Domestic ownership is also positively associated with collective 
bargaining.  Product markets also matter: those operating in a local market (as opposed to 
a regional, national or international market) are significantly more likely to have 
recognized unions and collective bargaining, as one might expect if local markets are an 
indicator of lower competitive pressures. Although the gender composition of the 
workforce is not associated with unionization and collective bargaining, the presence of 
temporary employees and those on fixed-term contracts is positively associated with 
sectoral bargaining. The presence of a joint consultative committee (either at workplace 
or organization level) is positively associated with union recognition and collective 
bargaining, a finding that perhaps reflects complementarity as opposed to substitutability, 
and is reminiscent of the link between works councils and collective bargaining in 
Germany. Team working and the use of contingent pay schemes are negatively associated 
with collective bargaining, the former association being driven by firm-level bargaining 
and the latter association by a sectoral bargaining connection. The year dummy indicates 
an absence of significant time trends.   
(Table 11 near here) 
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Next in Table 11 we model unionization and collective bargaining status in 2004 
as a function of covariates measured in the base period, 1998.  These models differ a little 
from the previous specifications in Table 10 reflecting the greater range of covariates 
available in the 1998 cross-section.19 There is strong persistence in recognition and 
collective bargaining status, as indicated by positive, significant coefficients on the 
lagged dependent variables. This is particularly so in the case of union recognition, which 
helps explain the high percentage of variance accounted for by this model. The exception 
is sectoral bargaining where the lagged dependent variable is not significant, either 
because it was in a state of flux or because these results suffer from measurement error, 
as one might expect if workplace managers are being asked to identify practices 
occurring above workplace level.  
Being a single-establishment organization in 1998 is not associated with 
unionization in 2004. However, larger establishments in 1998 were more likely to 
recognize unions and more likely to have firm-level collective bargaining in 2004 than 
smaller establishments. Domestic ownership is positively associated with union 
recognition. Family ownership, on the other hand, is negatively associated with all four 
union measures. Workforce composition effects (percent female, percent part-time, and 
the incidence of fixed-term or temporary employees) are generally not significant, apart 
from the case of sectoral collective bargaining where the percent female and the percent 
part-time coefficients have opposite signs. The probability of sectoral bargaining 
coverage in 2004 rises with the percent female in 1998, whereas it lowers the probability 
of firm-level bargaining. Occupational composition, as indicated by the largest non-
managerial occupation at the workplace, is statistically significant. Craft and skilled 
manual employees are least likely to work in workplaces recognising trade unions by 
2004, whereas those in operative and assembly occupations are the most likely to be 
doing so. Active collective bargaining in 2004 is least likely in workplaces where the 
largest occupational group in 1998 was personal service employees. Workplaces where 
professionals made up the largest group in 1998 had the greatest likelihood of coverage 
under sectoral-level bargaining in 2004. The occupational pattern of firm-level 
bargaining is quite different: it is least likely in 2004 in those workplaces where the 
largest occupational group in 1998 was personal services or science/technical employees. 
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A positive association with local product markets was only apparent in case of sectoral 
bargaining.  There is a strong negative association between being located in London and 
collective bargaining, both sectoral and firm-level.  The presence of a JCC in 1998 was 
positively associated with union recognition in 2004, but not with collective bargaining 
coverage. Finally, the use of contingent pay in 1998 was negatively associated with union 
recognition and sectoral bargaining in 2004, but not with firm-level bargaining. There are 
two broad points emerging from Table 11 that are worthy of note. First, much of the 
variance in unionization and collective bargaining status can be captured with workplace-
level covariates obtained some 6 to 7 years previously. Second, the correlates of these 
alternative measures of union engagement in pay bargaining differ in a number of 
dimensions. The only statistically significant effect that is common to all four models is 
the negative association with family ownership.  
The next logical step in our exploration of factors affecting collective bargaining 
and worker representation is to identify workplace characteristics which predispose 
workplaces to switch bargaining regime, as opposed to sticking with their original 
arrangements. To investigate this we distinguish between four outcomes. The first, which 
is the default position in Britain, is to remain without union representation or collective 
bargaining coverage throughout the period (0 in 1998 and 0 in 2004). The second 
outcome is being covered in 1998 but uncovered by the time of the 2004 survey (1 in 
1998 and 0 in 2004). The third outcome is entering into bargaining coverage over the 
period (0 in 1998 and 1 in 2004). The final outcome is remaining covered throughout the 
period (1 in 1998 and 1 in 2004). We seek to establish which 1998 workplace 
characteristics are independently associated with these four states by running multinomial 
logits and using the same set of covariates as in Table 11. 
(Table 12 near here) 
Table 12 presents this analysis for union recognition status. Three-quarters (74 
percent) of panel establishments did not recognize unions in either 1998 or 2004; one-
fifth (20 percent) recognized unions in both periods; the remaining 6 percent had 
switched status with 2 percent no longer recognizing unions and 4 percent  recognizing 
them for the first time over the period. The probability of recognizing unions throughout 
the period, or recognizing them for the first time, was higher among larger workplaces. 
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Domestically-owned workplaces were more likely to stick with union recognition, or 
become unionized, than workplaces that were foreign-owned in 1998.  Family ownership 
was strongly associated with remaining non-union throughout the period, as was being 
located in London.   
It is a commonly-held belief that 1980 was a turning point in the unionization of 
British workplaces: evidence has consistently indicated that workplaces set up prior to 
1980 have higher union recognition rates than younger workplaces, with some pointing to 
the early post-war period as the ‘golden era’ for unionization (Millward et al., 2000: 101-
103).  However, Blanchflower and Bryson (2009: 51-53) found this had started to change 
observing a decline in the unionization rate among older workplaces. We find more such 
evidence here, since workplaces born before 1980 are more likely to cease to recognize a 
union and less likely to initiate recognition than their younger counterparts.   
Relative to those operating in wider product markets, those with local markets 
emerge as not only more likely to be unionized throughout the period but also more likely 
to cease to recognise unions. The presence of a JCC in 1998 is conducive to remaining 
unionized throughout, whereas the increased use of contingent pay schemes appears to 
have reduced the probability of workplaces becoming unionized. 
As noted earlier, the incidence of collective bargaining was less stable in the panel 
than the presence of recognized unions. Although seven-in-ten (71 percent) workplaces 
remained uncovered by any collective bargaining throughout, only 8 percent were 
covered in both 1998 and 2004.  The remaining one-fifth (21 percent) were ‘switchers,’ 
with 9 percent moving from covered to uncovered status and 11 percent moving back the 
other way.  Table 13 adopts the same estimation approach to that adopted for Table 12 to 
identify workplace correlates of these changes. The model explains less of the variance in 
collective bargaining status than it did union recognition (the pseudo-R2 being 0.37 as 
opposed to 0.45). 
(Table 13 near here) 
The correlates of changing bargaining coverage status differ in a number of 
respects from the correlates of changing union recognition status. Larger establishments 
are more likely to remain covered throughout, as in the case of union recognition in Table 
12 but, in contrast to the union recognition model, larger establishments are also more 
39 
likely to quit the covered sector than smaller establishments. Domestic ownership in 1998 
is associated with becoming covered by 2004, but not with persistence in coverage.  
Family ownership is associated with a lower probability of becoming covered by 2004 
but it is not associated with leaving coverage or with persistent coverage. Workplace age 
plays no significant role. Workforce composition does play a significant role in coverage 
change: a higher percentage of female employees reduces the probability of persistent 
coverage relative to never being covered, whereas a higher percentage of part-time 
workers does the opposite. Compared with workplaces operating in regional, national, 
and international product markets, those operating in local product markets are less likely 
to be uncovered throughout and have a higher probability of switching in and out of 
collective bargaining. JCCs are associated with persistent collective bargaining coverage 
but also with leaving coverage. Greater use of contingent pay schemes and location in 
London are both associated with a lower likelihood of having any contact with collective 
bargaining over the period. 
(Table 14 near here) 
Sectoral collective bargaining is relatively uncommon in Britain compared with 
Germany. In the WERS Panel almost nine-tenths (86 percent) of workplaces had not used 
sectoral collective bargaining in either 1998 or 2004. A mere 1 percent used it in both 
years. Eight percent appear to have joined a sectoral agreement by 2004, while 4 percent 
had sectoral bargaining coverage in 1998 but were no longer covered by a sectoral 
agreement in 2004. This distribution of responses makes it relatively difficult to estimate 
changes in sectoral collective bargaining status over the period. The model in Table 14 
accounts for 44 percent of the variance in sectoral bargaining status, but much of this is 
soaked up by industry dummy variables, which is why we include them here.   
Compared with the reference category (Education, Health and Other Community 
Services) workplaces in other industries were less likely to be persistently covered by a 
sectoral agreement, with the exception of Construction where continued sectoral 
coverage was most likely. Larger establishments in 1998 had a higher probability of 
continued sectoral coverage compared with smaller establishments. Domestic and family 
ownership were not significant. Four service sector industries – Hotels and Restaurants, 
Transport and Communication, Financial Services and Business Services – all had a 
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higher probability of entering into a sectoral agreement than did Education, Health and 
Other Community Services. Workforce composition also played a role: in addition to a 
number of significant occupational effects, the probability of persistent sectoral coverage 
and the probability of joining a sectoral agreement fell in those workplaces with higher 
percentages of female employees in 1998. Links to firm-level human resource practices 
are also apparent. Use of contingent pay was negatively associated with any contact with 
sectoral agreements over the period; having a JCC in 1998 lowered the probability of 
persistent sectoral bargaining coverage relative to no coverage; and a high incidence of 
team-working in 1998 led to an increased likelihood of leaving a sectoral agreement.  
Those in local product markets in 1998 were more likely than those in larger markets to 
have joined a sectoral agreement. Finally, location in London was associated with a lower 
propensity to resort to sectoral bargaining. 
Four-fifths (81 percent) of workplaces had no firm-level (either workplace-level 
or organization-level) collective bargaining agreement in 1998 and 2004; 4 percent had 
one in both years; and the remaining 14 percent were split evenly between those dropping 
their firm agreement and those who had adopted one. The correlates of firm-level 
bargaining status, shown in Table 15, differ in many ways from those for sectoral-level 
bargaining. For instance, there is no significant association with the use of contingent pay 
in 1998. Nevertheless, there are some points of similarity such as the negative association 
between location in London and bargaining coverage. Once again, establishment size 
plays a prominent role. The probability of retaining a firm-level agreement, and the 
probability of leaving one, both rise with establishment size relative to the probability of 
having no firm agreement throughout. Single-establishment organizations are less likely 
than multiple-establishment organizations to maintain a firm-level agreement throughout, 
while family ownership in 1998 reduces the probability of adopting a firm-level 
bargaining agreement by 2004. Workforce composition also seems to play a role, with 
occupational composition, part-time and fixed-term employment all recording 
statistically significant influences. So, too, does the location of the product market, with 
local product markets being more likely to abandon firm-level bargaining than other 
workplaces with wider markets.  A high incidence of team working in 1998 is associated 
with a lower probability of firm-level bargaining in both years, whereas JCC presence is 
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associated with both a higher probability of persistence in firm-level agreements and a 
higher propensity to cease to bargain at firm-level. 
(Table 15 near here) 
Finally, we consider the correlates of Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) status.  
Table 16 presents results for JCCs at either workplace or firm level, while Table 17 
presents identical multinomial logit models but restricts the definition of the entity to 
workplace level alone. There is much more switching in JCC status than in bargaining 
arrangements. For JCCs at establishment or firm level, two-fifths (43 percent) had no 
JCC in either year; one-quarter (23 percent) had one in both years; 16 percent abolished 
an existing JCC; and one-sixth (18 percent) introduced one. The corresponding values for 
workplace-level JCCs are 74, 7, 9, and 10 percent, respectively. Given these markedly 
different distributions it is hardly surprising that the workplace correlates of JCC status in 
the panel differ according to whether one uses the ‘any JCC’ variable in Table 16 or the 
‘workplace-level JCC’ in Table 17. 
(Tables 16 and 17 near here) 
The size and nature of the organization play an important role in determining JCC 
status in Britain. The probability of having a JCC in both years is significantly higher 
among larger establishments and JCCs are less in evidence in single-site firms. The 
impact of establishment size is even greater in the case of workplace JCCs, but the single 
establishment effect disappears. Domestically-owned establishments are less likely to be 
adopters of JCCs than their foreign counterparts, but this effect is not apparent for 
workplace-level JCCs. Family ownership is associated with a lower incidence of JCCs, 
but the effect is confined to the persistence of JCCs when one focuses on workplace-level 
institutions. 
Whereas the presence of a recognised union in 1998 is associated with a higher 
probability of JCC presence throughout the period, this association is totally absent in the 
case of workplace JCCs. Another big difference is the London effect, which is associated 
with a significantly higher probability of having a workplace JCC throughout the period, 
despite having no significant association with JCCs in general. Finally, those 
establishments operating in a local product market in 1998 had a lower probability than 
other workplaces of switching in and out of workplace-JCC status, a finding that only 
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holds for all JCCs in relation to the abolition option. Taken together, it is clear that one 
needs to be cautious when generalizing about the correlates of JCC status since the 
factors influencing the presence of workplace JCCs appear to differ in a number of 
respects from those factors influencing JCCs that exist at either workplace or 
organization-level. 
 
VII.  Conclusions 
The decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany in the sample                           
period is material but less dramatic than might have been expected. After some 
pronounced decline in the 1980s and early 1990s, arguably a degree of normalcy has 
returned. But only later years will tell whether this is sustainable and the outcome of 
organized deregulation. The decline in collective bargaining coverage cannot be due 
simply to industry dynamics as trends across the subgroups examined here are very 
broadly comparable. Moreover, it has not been offset by any opposite shift in 
‘orientation.’ That is to say, orientation toward collective agreements on the part of 
uncovered employers has remained fairly constant over the sample period. But this result 
again qualifies the notion of there having been a continued erosion in the influence of 
collective bargaining.  
     Despite substantive institutional inertia, we do observe fairly active switching in 
and out of collective bargaining. Establishment size, branch plant status, skill 
composition of the workforce and, in some specifications, plant age and works council 
presence tend to favor sectoral collective bargaining status and conversely in the case of 
market competition and export propensity. However, the evidence is weaker than in 
simple cross-section studies, while the correlates of firm-level bargaining emerge as quite 
distinct. Changes in collective bargaining status are intriguing in the sense of offering  
very mixed support for our priors both as regards joining sectoral and firm-level 
agreements and leaving firm-level agreements. Little support is adduced for any of our 
regressors (other than the industry dummies) in the case of establishments abandoning 
sectoral agreements. 
     Works council introduction and abandonment appears both better determined and 
more symmetric, even if the associations uncovered here are again not always consistent 
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with those reported in the literature. A final issue is the collective bargaining-works 
council nexus. Works councils are positively associated with collective bargaining 
presence but in terms of switching only with the introduction of firm-level agreements. 
And the presence of collective agreements tends to favor the introduction of works 
councils and detract from their abandonment. Overall, the suggestion is that the two 
entities play a supportive role  
     The British and German systems are fundamentally different. In particular, 
sectoral-level bargaining is the ‘default’ in Germany whereas, by the start of our period 
of investigation, it had all but disappeared in the British private sector. Instead, in the vast 
majority of British firms it is management that sets pay unilaterally rather than resorting 
to collective bargaining. 
     In contrast to Germany, British firms can combine sectoral and firm-level 
bargaining. In practice, however, we do not observe mix and match. Nearly all the firms 
setting some pay with collective bargaining used either sectoral or firm-level bargaining. 
Among those using collective bargaining, firm-level bargaining is more common than 
sectoral-level bargaining. 
     As in Germany, collective bargaining was in decline over the period 1998-2004. In 
Britain this was most evident in sectoral-level bargaining. But, unlike the situation in 
Germany, Joint Consultative Committees (JCCs) were also in conspicuous decline over 
this period. Much of the decline in collective bargaining is accounted for by 
compositional change in workplaces: those workplaces leaving the population, either 
because they died or had shrunk below the size threshold for inclusion in the survey, had 
higher rates of collective bargaining than new workplaces that had either been born since 
1998 or had grown above the lower size threshold. Change among continuing 
establishments was much less pronounced. 
     The amount of switching in and out of collective bargaining among British panel 
establishments is considerable. Nevertheless, there is substantial persistence in collective 
bargaining status, as indicated by the large positive effects of lagged bargaining status in 
the regression analysis. Switching is less common when one uses the measure of union 
recognition to proxy union involvement in pay bargaining. And the proportion of 
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establishments introducing and abolishing JCCs is much higher than the switching in 
collective bargaining status.  
     Finally, much of the variance in collective bargaining status can be captured with 
workplace-level covariates obtained some six to seven years previously but the bottom 
line is that the correlates of sectoral and firm-level bargaining differ quite markedly. 
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Endonotes 
1. For contrasting evaluations of the outcome of the process of decentralization, see 
Ochel (2003) and Massa-Wirth and Niechoj (2004).  
2. This is not to deny the fact that a process of ‘juridification’ has occurred which is 
continually shaping what was once a voluntaristic system (Dickens and Hall, 2009). 
3. See http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1992/ukpga_19920052_en_11#pt4-ch1-pb2-
l1g179 
4. It is notable that when the U.K. government enacted the Information and Consultation 
of Employees Regulations, which brought into force at EU requirement for employers to 
consult employees, they did so in such a way that employers were able to fulfill this 
commitment through direct communication methods – so that representative structures 
were unnecessary. Health and safety committees and representatives are exceptional in 
the British case: their status is underpinned by a strong tripartite system of statutory 
regulation. However, here we follow the traditional approach of excluding single-issue 
committees such as health and safety committees from our definition of joint consultative 
committees. 
5. On this symbiosis, see in particular the recent work of Behrens (2009) who examines 
on the basis of the fourth WSI survey of works councils the extent to which the entity is 
actively involved in the recruitment of union members based on such factors as union 
support, union strategies, works council union density, the presence of workplace union 
representatives as well as structural establishment and workforce characteristics. A wider 
discussion of the union-works council nexus is contained in Addison (2009). 
6. Noting, however, that smaller employers may have a greater need to increase their 
collective bargaining power, Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, and Kohaut (2006) suggest using a 
quadratic in employment size.). 
7. For a more detailed discussion focusing on the timing of opening clauses and the 
impact of the two types on wages in the manufacturing sector of Baden-Württemberg 
using the German Structure of Earnings Survey, see Heinbach (2007). 
8. For a parallel analysis of the determinants of pacts for employment and 
competitiveness based on the 2003 WIC works council survey, see Ellguth and Kohaut 
(2008), Massa-Wirth and Niechoj (2004); Siefert and Massa-Wirth (2005). On the effects 
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of pacts, see Hübler (2005a, 2005b, 2006); Bellmann, Gerlach, and Meyer (2008); 
Bellmann and Gerner (2009). 
9. For discussion of these theoretical effects, particularly the effects of industry-level 
bargaining, see Bryson and Wilkinson (2002: Chapter 2, endnote 6). And for a rare 
empirical study exploring the effect of industry-level bargaining on firm performance in 
Britain, see Menezes-Filho (1997).   
10. Large plants are oversampled but the sampling within each cell is random. 
11. A detailed overview of the sample sizes and the filters applied are available from the 
authors upon request. 
12. Either because the target structure (the number of establishments or employees in the 
target structure of the respective weighting cell) changes, or because the number of 
surveyed establishments in the weighting cell changes, and/or because an establishment 
changes, size, industry or federal state between two waves. 
13. For full information on the surveys, see Kersley et al. (2006); Cully et al. (1999); and 
Chaplin et al. (2005). 
14. For a full discussion of this issue see Kersley et al. (2006), pp. 181-188 and footnotes 
1 and 3 in Chapter 7. 
15. Rather fewer coefficient estimates were well defined than when using unweighted 
data, including the establishment size argument. Weighted data are used in the interests 
of facilitating comparisons between Britain and Germany. 
16. However, there is evidence of a spillover effect of collective bargaining on the wages 
of uncovered employees in the same workplace (Millward and Forth, 2004). 
17. In the 1998 cross-section, 69 percent of private sector workplaces were ‘stayers.’ The 
remainder were ‘leavers,’ consisting of workplaces that closed down (19 percent) and 
workplaces that shrank below the 10 employee threshold (12 percent). In the 2004 cross-
section, 69 percent were stayers while 31 percent were joiners. 
18. These figures do not match the estimates of switching behavior taken from the 
establishment’s status at the two survey cross-section time points. This may arise for 
three reasons. First, the retrospective questions may have captured new recognitions and 
derecognitions of unions in multiple union settings, whereupon such changes may not 
necessarily have affected their status as having at least one recognised union or not. For 
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example, a workplace with three recognized unions in 1998 may report a derecognition in 
response to the retrospective question covering the period 1998-2004.  However, it may 
still have two recognized unions remaining, in which case they will still be classified as 
unionized in 2004. Second, the retrospective questions may capture switches in the 
intervening period between 1998 and 2004 which, if reversed subsequently, will not be 
captured in comparisons of union status at the beginning and the end of the period. Third, 
responses to retrospective questions may be subject to more measurement error than 
responses about status at a single point in time. 
19. Reflecting the fact that the 2004 follow-up survey was much shorter than the 1998 
survey due to budgetary constraints. 
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Table 1 
Transitions in the Collective Bargaining and Works Council Status of German Establishments between 1998 and 2004,  
Weighted Data 
 
  Works council Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level collective 
bargaining  
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete  
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete  
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete  
panel 
Incomplete 
panel 
Complete  
panel 
Always existing 6.7% 7.3% 42.6% 44.4% 39.3% 40.5% 1.3% 2.0% 
Introduced 1.7% 2.5% 4.2%        2.8% 4.9% 3.1% 1.2% 1.7% 
Abolished 2.0% 2.5% 15.6% 15.2% 15.2% 14.7% 2.4% 2.5% 
Never existing 89.7% 87.7% 37.6% 37.5% 40.6% 41.8% 95.0% 93.8% 
Net change -0.3% 0.0% -11.4% -12..4% -10.3% -11.7% -1.2% -0.7% 
Number of observations 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021 318,561 184,021 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Table 2   
Probit Pooled Estimates of the Determinants of Collective Bargaining (Any Type, Sectoral, and 
Firm-Level), Germany, 1998 and 2004, Weighted Data 
 Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level collective 
bargaining  
Year (2004) -0.301*** -0.259*** -0.170* 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.099) 
Log establishment size  0.160** 0.148**  0.057 
 (0.076) (0.070) (0.089) 
Increasing sales expected  0.046  0.083 -0.185 
 (0.137) (0.132) (0.143) 
High-tech  0.066  0.047  0.106 
 (0.124) (0.122) (0.106) 
Age of establishment   0.345**  0.309**  0.118 
 (0.150) (0.146) (0.172) 
Exports -0.009* -0.013**  0.0137*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Single plant -0.225 -0.166 -0.098 
 (0.214) (0.196) (0.129) 
R&D -0.327 -0.238 -0.227 
 (0.219) (0.211) (0.183) 
Delegation  0.383**  0.379** -0.125 
 (0.183) (0.173) (0.179) 
Team-work  0.200  0.246 -0.208 
 (0.196) (0.184) (0.190) 
Profit-center -0.119 -0.103 -0.022 
 (0.215) (0.197) (0.163) 
 Skilled workers  0.0020  0.00244  0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female workers  0.002  0.0003  0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Fixed-term workers -0.014** -0.013** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Part-time workers -0.0007  0.0002 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Works council present  1.281***  0.759***  0.674*** 
 (0.159) (0.169) (0.180) 
Individually-owned firm  0.106 0.101  0.041 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.116) 
Foreign property -0.386 -0.695**  0.773** 
 (0.285) (0.279) (0.319) 
Western Germany  0.607*** 0.733*** -0.651*** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.114) 
Constant -0.154     0.106    -3.177*** 
 (0.497) (0.504) (0.588) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.27 0.25 0.19 
n 3,067 3,084 3,066 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels.   
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 1998 and 2004.  
Table 3 
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Probit Estimates of End-Period (i.e. 2004) Collective Bargaining Status, Germany, Weighted 
Data (the determinants are beginning-period (i.e. 1998) establishment characteristics) 
 
 Collective bargaining 
of any type 
Sectoral 
collective 
bargaining 
Firm-level 
collective 
bargaining 
Collective bargaining of any type  1.757***   
 (0.179)   
Sectoral collective bargaining   1.701***  
  (0.174)  
Firm-level collective bargaining    2.232*** 
   (0.377) 
Log establishment size  0.198**  0.217**  0.037 
 (0.090) (0.088) (0.108) 
Increasing sales expected -0.014  0.087 -0.728*** 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.192) 
High-tech  0.454***  0.551*** -0.379** 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.188) 
Age of establishment  -0.143 -0.142 -0.0004 
 (0.186) (0.183) (0.211) 
Exports  0.007 -0.0008  0.0142** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Single plant  0.260  0.379* -0.459** 
 (0.228) (0.224) (0.226) 
R&D -0.392 -0.544**  0.577** 
 (0.279) (0.272) (0.281) 
Delegation  0.534**  0.414  0.443* 
 (0.258) (0.269) (0.230) 
Team-work  0.060 0.137 -0.257 
 (0.269) (0.272) (0.245) 
Profit-center -0.374* -0.283 -0.284 
 (0.222) (0.222) (0.250) 
 Skilled workers  0.004  0.005* -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Female workers  0.009**  0.010** -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Fixed-term workers  0.003  0.004  0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) 
Part-time workers -0.007* -0.009**  0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Works council present  0.244  0.079  0.841*** 
 (0.232) (0.234) (0.314) 
Individually-owned firm  0.085  0.156 -0.415 
 (0.190) (0.192) (0.256) 
Foreign property  0.505  0.276  0.436 
 (0.397) (0.272) (0.427) 
Profit sharing  0.147  0.185 -0.302 
 (0.225) (0.226) (0.283) 
High competition  -0.260 -0.338**  0.432** 
 (0.167) (0.169) (0.170) 
Western Germany  0.679***  0.788*** -0.895*** 
 (0.169) (0.170) (0.192) 
56 
Constant -3.317***  -3.326***  -2.440* 
 (0.777) (0.746) (0.754) 
    
Pseudo R2 0.44 0.45 0.51 
n  1,624 1,624 1,494 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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 Table 4 
Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Transitions into and out of the Various Collective 
Bargaining Regimes, Germany, Weighted Data 
 Collective bargaining of 
any type 
Sectoral collective 
bargaining  
Firm-level collective 
bargaining 
Introduced Abolished Introduced Abolished Introduced Abolished 
Log establishment size 
 0.345** -0.195  0.387*** -0.156 -0.005 -0.321* 
 (0.158) (0.121) (0.141) (0.125) (0.116) (0.179) 
Increasing sales expected 
-0.869*** -0.199 -0.502* -0.276 -0.537***  1.126*** 
 (0.303) (0.190) (0.264) (0.201) (0.194) (0.372) 
High-tech  1.093*** -0.394*  1.311*** -0.455** -0.456** 0.845* 
 (0.334) (0.212) (0.311) (0.217) (0.193) (0.461) 
Age of establishment  
-1.013*** -0.122 -0.750*** -0.080 -0.153  1.917*** 
 (0.304) (0.215) (0.273) (0.228) (0.196) (0.581) 
Exports  0.005 -0.013 -0.028** -0.012  0.013**  0.002 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) 
Single plant  1.074** -0.099  0.837* -0.184 -0.492**  0.215 
 (0.523) (0.270) (0.440) (0.274) (0.250) (0.482) 
R&D -0.050  0.527 -0.894**  0.488  0.384 -1.504** 
 (0.360) (0.334) (0.405) (0.343) (0.270) (0.631) 
Delegation  1.209*** -0.374  1.107** -0.276  0.504**  0.038 
 (0.447) (0.236) (0.466) (0.244) (0.239) (0.599) 
Team-work  0.323 -0.0224 -0.013 -0.226 -0.077  0.697 
 (0.426) (0.279) (0.445) (0.301) (0.229) (0.494) 
Profit-center -0.441  0.250 -0.406  0.251 -0.139 -0.120 
 (0.427) (0.283) (0.419) (0.288) (0.288) (0.515) 
Skilled workers  0.013*** -0.003  0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004 (0.004) (0.008) 
Female workers  0.017** -0.007  0.021*** -0.007  0.002  0.020* 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
Fixed-term workers -0.016 -0.0109 -0.011 -0.016  0.006  0.036* 
 (0.022) (0.0113) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008) (0.019) 
Part-time workers  0.006  0.009** -0.006  0.020**  0.0009 -0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) 
Works council  0.114 -0.172  0.286  0.074  0.998*** -0.587 
 (0.652) (0.260) (0.538) (0.263) (0.326) (0.531) 
Individually-owned firm 
 0.168 -0.152  0.209 -0.207 -0.466  0.027 
 (0.340) (0.221) (0.309) (0.235) (0.292) (0.575) 
Foreign property  1.575*** -0.105  1.337*** -0.697  0.669  0.101 
 (0.586) (0.455) (0.495) (0.501) (0.466) (0.601) 
Profit sharing -0.442 -0.385 -0.858** -0.398 -0.581* -1.134* 
 (0.446) (0.275) (0.432) (0.289) (0.347) (0.604) 
High competition  -0.937*** 0.142 -0.593**  0.207  0.359** -0.721* 
 (0.291) (0.197) (0.272) (0.208) (0.177) (0.389) 
Western Germany  0.571** -0.575*** 1.207*** -0.671*** -1.176*** -0.340 
 (0.287) (0.196) (0.304) (0.204) (0.198) (0.596) 
Constant -5.128*** 1.603*    -4.509***    1.886**    -2.411***   2.572    
 (1.637) (0.893)      (1.278)     (0.861)      (0.884)    (1.915)      
       
Pseudo R2 0.45 0.20 0.41 0.23 0.43 0.72 
n  418 1,088 613 919 1,234 153 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 5 
Probit Estimates of the Determinants of Transitions into and out of Works Council Status, 
Germany, Weighted Data 
 Introduced    (1) Abolished     (2) 
Log establishment size  0.657*** -2.445*** 
 (0.143) (0.391) 
Increasing sales expected -0.734** -1.307** 
 (0.303) (0.566) 
High-tech  0.837**  1.659*** 
 (0.368) (0.477) 
Age of establishment   0.0509 -1.074** 
 (0.355) (0.499) 
Exports  0.007  0.011 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Single plant -0.024  1.302*** 
 (0.342) (0.404) 
R&D  0.853** -1.947*** 
 (0.394) (0.686) 
Delegation  0.437  0.793* 
 (0.483) (0.410) 
Team-work -1.031**  0.365 
 (0.523) (0.434) 
Profit-center -0.113  0.846* 
 (0.494) (0.462) 
Skilled workers  0.003 -0.0103* 
 (0.005) (0.006) 
Female workers  0.027*** -0.008 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
Fixed-term workers  0.005  0.103*** 
 (0.016) (0.027) 
Part-time workers -0.030*** -0.016 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Individually-owned firm -2.933***  2.277*** 
 (0.672) (0.763) 
Foreign property  1.408** -2.547** 
 (0.578) (1.226) 
Profit sharing  0.259 -0.382 
 (0.391) (0.501) 
High competition  -0.232 -0.974** 
 (0.358) (0.470) 
Western Germany  0.174  0.251 
 (0.392) (0.489) 
Sectoral agreements  0.555 -1.731*** 
 (0.367) (0.524) 
Firm-level agreements  1.208*** -0.798 
 (0.432) (0.589) 
Constant -13.360***   13.864***    
 (1.058) (2.793)     
   
Pseudo R2 0.57 0.77 
n  487 586 
Note: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 6 
Workplace Incidence of Collective Bargaining, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
1998 (%) 20.4 16.6 5.6 11.0 36.3 (14.3) 
2004 (%) 14.8 10.6 2.3 8.4 29.4 (9.5) 
 -5.6 -6.0 -3.3 -2.6 -6.9 (-4.8) 
Notes: (1)  denotes percentage point change. (2) Firm agreements include those at workplace 
and at organization level. (3)  JCC figures are for all JCCs whether at workplace or organization 
level; figures in parentheses are workplace-level JCCs. (4) All figures are workplace-weighted. 
(5) Unweighted workplace sample sizes in 1998 are 1469 for collective bargaining, 1,460 for 
union recognition, and 1,494 for JCC. (6) Unweighted workplace sample sizes in 2004 are 1,458 
for collective bargaining, 1,428 for union recognition, and 1,489 for JCC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Employee Coverage by Worker Representation and Collective Bargaining, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
1998 (%) 38.7 26.9 4.6 22.3 50.8 (33.2) 
2004 (%) 32.2 21.3 4.1 17.2 48.6 (32.7) 
 -6.5 -5.6 -0.5 -4.1 -2.2 (-0.5) 
Notes: (1) All figures are employee weighted.  See also notes to Table 6. 
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Table 8 
Behavioral Versus Compositional Change, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
consultative 
committee 
Stayers      
Cross-section: 
  1998 
  2004 
   
Panel: 
  1998 
  2004 
   
 
21.0 
18.1 
-2.9 
 
22.2 
24.2 
+2.0 
 
16.0 
12.1 
-3.9 
 
17.3 
20.0 
+2.7 
 
5.5 
2.0 
-3.5 
 
5.7 
9.4 
+3.7 
 
10.5 
10.0 
-0.5 
 
11.5 
11.4 
-0.1 
 
39.7 (15.5) 
30.2 (11.0) 
-9.5 (-4.5) 
 
38.5 (15.8) 
41.4 (17.0) 
+2.6 (1.2) 
Changers      
Leavers 1998 
Joiners 2004 
 
19.1 
7.5 
-11.6 
17.9 
7.1 
-10.8 
6.0 
2.9 
-3.1 
12.1 
4.8 
-7.3 
28.7 (11.6) 
27.4 (6.3) 
-1.3 (-5.3) 
Notes: (1)  denotes percentage point change. (2) Cross-section stayers are defined using survey 
data on workplace age and size. 1998 stayers are those workplaces surveyed in 1998 that were 
still in existence in 2004 with 10 or more employees. 2004 stayers are those workplaces surveyed 
in 2004 that had been in existence with 10 or more employees in 1998. (3) All panel cases are 
‘stayers’ since they had 10 or more employees in both 1998 and 2004. (4) Leavers are workplaces 
with 10 or more employees surveyed in 1998 that subsequently closed before 2004, or whose 
employment size had shrunk below 10 by 2004. Joiners are workplaces with 10 or more 
employees surveyed in 2004 that were either born after 1998 or had been in existence with fewer 
than 10 employees in 1998. (5) Unweighted workplace sample sizes are as follows: panel 
between 575 and 587 depending on workplace measure; 1998 stayers = 1,202; 1998 leavers = 
292; 2004 stayers = 1,206; 2004 joiners = 280. 
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Table 9 
Switching Behavior in Panel Workplaces, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
 
 Union 
recognition 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Joint 
Consultative 
Committee 
Always (%) 19.7 8.5 1.2 4.3 22.8 (7.0) 
Introduced (%) 4.1 11.9 8.2 7.1 18.3 (10.1) 
Abolished (%) 2.4 8.7 4.5 7.2 15.7 (8.8) 
Never (%) 73.9 70.9 86.2 81.5 43.2 (74.2) 
   ∆ +1.7 +3.2 +3.7 -0.1 +2.6 (+1.3) 
Notes: (1)  denotes percentage point change. (2) Unweighted sample size is between 568 and 
587 depending on workplace measure. 
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Table 10 
Probit Estimates for Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining, Great Britain, Pooled 
Data for WERS Panel 1998-2004 
 
 
 
Recognition 
 
Any 
collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Year (2004) -0.022  0.159  0.344 -0.064 
 (0.085) (0.166) (0.251) (0.175) 
Log establishment size  0.267***  0.262*** -0.012  0.395*** 
 (0.099) (0.084) (0.110) (0.069) 
Single plant -0.301 -0.267  0.234 -0.903*** 
 (0.266) (0.212) (0.194) (0.232) 
U.K. ownership  0.253  0.314*  0.345  0.300* 
 (0.241) (0.176) (0.277) (0.166) 
Local market  0.433**  0.621***  0.417*  0.471*** 
 (0.201) (0.193) (0.225) (0.171) 
Female workers  0.902 -0.500 -0.335 -0.280 
 (0.563) (0.356) (0.414) (0.354) 
Fixed-term workers -0.063  0.281  0.482*  0.024 
 (0.123) (0.201) (0.247) (0.160) 
Team work -0.093 -0.322**  0.039 -0.571*** 
 (0.142) (0.155) (0.181) (0.163) 
No. of contingent pay practices -0.071 -0.256*** -0.340*** -0.089 
 (0.070) (0.066) (0.109) (0.077) 
JCC  0.731***  0.477***  0.241  0.546*** 
 (0.152) (0.155) (0.173) (0.168) 
Constant -1.511*** -1.581*** -1.852*** -2.053*** 
 (0.564) (0.399) (0.481) (0.423) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.37 0.22  0.21  0.28 
n 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors clustered to account for repeated observations are in parentheses. All models 
include 10 single-digit industry dummies. Controls are as follows. Year (2004): year dummy; Log 
establishment size: log number of employees at workplace; Single plant: dummy for single 
establishment; U.K ownership: dummy for U.K. ownership; Local market: dummy for local 
product/service market (the default category is regional, national, and international markets); 
Female workers: percentage of  employees female; Fixed-term workers: dummy for any 
temporary or fixed-term employees; Team work: 60% or more of employees in largest 
occupational group work in teams; No. of contingent pay practices: count  of contingent pay 
practices (profit-related pay, deferred profit-sharing, employee share ownership, individual or 
group performance-related pay, and other cash bonuses); and JCC dummy for presence of a JCC 
at workplace or organizational level. 
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Table 11 
Probit Estimates for Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining Status in 2004 
Conditioning on 1998 Covariates, Great Britain, WERS Panel 1998-2004 
 
 
Recognition 
 
Any collective 
bargaining 
Sectoral 
agreement 
Firm-level 
agreement 
Log establishment size  0.346***  0.152  0.027  0.276** 
 (0.102) (0.132) (0.175) (0.130) 
Single plant -0.220  0.355  0.295  0.069 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.286) (0.277) 
U.K. ownership  1.028***  0.247  0.225  0.266 
 (0.286) (0.212) (0.373) (0.252) 
Family owned -0.967*** -0.666** -0.648* -0.539* 
 (0.292) (0.307) (0.383) (0.305) 
Establishment age -0.49* -0.387* -0.281 -0.275 
 (0.250) (0.224) (0.258) (0.224) 
Occupation 1 -0.447  0.599  1.667*** -0.343 
 (0.473) (0.444) (0.598) (0.441) 
Occupation 2  0.073 -0.065  0.766 -0.728* 
 (0.600) (0.422) (0.615) (0.429) 
Occupation 3 -0.114  0.089  0.189  0.004 
 (0.400) (0.438) (0.477) (0.490) 
Occupation 4 -1.270***  0.233 -0.185 -0.030 
 (0.482) (0.416) (0.504) (0.413) 
Occupation 5 -0.071 -0.670* -0.631 -0.901* 
 (0.550) (0.401) (0.662) (0.538) 
Occupation 6 -0.153  0.169  0.224 -0.469 
 (0.401) (0.433) (0.516) (0.426) 
Occupation 7  0.642*  0.181  0.271 -0.225 
 (0.379) (0.389) (0.438) (0.426) 
Female workers -0.002 -0.007 -0.020**  0.006 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Part-time workers  0.004  0.003  0.024** -0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
Fixed-term workers -0.125  0.099  0.104 -0.140 
 (0.211) (0.247) (0.341) (0.223) 
Local market  0.029  0.299  0.707** -0.213 
 (0.303) (0.281) (0.345) (0.266) 
JCC  0.522** -0.047 -0.296  0.271 
 (0.224) (0.219) (0.263) (0.203) 
Team work -0.022 -0.133 -0.233  0.083 
 (0.225) (0.237) (0.297) (0.226) 
No. contingent pay practices 
-0.199* -0.193 -0.347** -0.076 
 (0.109) (0.123) (0.148) (0.091) 
London -0.294 -0.699** -1.431*** -0.53* 
 (0.232) (0.279) (0.529) (0.320) 
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Union recognition  2.808***    
 (0.249)    
Any collective bargaining   0.936***   
  (0.266)   
Sectoral collective bargaining 
   0.176  
   (0.474)  
Firm-level collective bargaining 
    1.105*** 
    (0.248) 
Constant -3.136*** -1.600** -2.667*** -1.804*** 
 (0.694) (0.776) (0.963) (0.853) 
     
Pseudo R2  0.699  0.256 0.377  0.285 
n  584  572 566  584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors clustered to account for repeated observations are in parentheses. All models 
include 8 single-digit industry dummies. Controls are all measured in 1998 and are as follows. 
Log establishment size: log number of employees at workplace; Single plant: dummy for single 
establishment; U.K ownership: dummy for U.K. ownership; Family owned: dummy for family 
owned; Establishment age: a dummy for establishment aged 25 or more years; Occupation 
variables identify the largest non-managerial occupational group in the workplace where 1 = 
professionals, 2 = scientific/technical; 3 = clerical/secretarial; 4 = craft and skilled manual; 5 = 
personal service; 6 = sales; 7 = operative and assembly and reference is routine unskilled manual; 
Local market: dummy for local product/service market (the default category is regional, national, 
and international markets); Female workers: percentage of employees female; Fixed-term 
workers: dummy for any temporary or fixed-term employees; Team work: 60% or more of 
employees in largest occupational group work in teams; No. of contingent pay practices: count  of 
contingent pay practices (profit-related pay, deferred profit-sharing, employee share ownership, 
individual or group performance-related pay, and other cash bonuses); London: dummy for 
location in London; and JCC: dummy for presence of  a JCC at workplace or organizational level. 
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Table 12 
     Multinomial Logit Estimates for Union Recognition Status, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
(reference category is no recognition in 1998 and 2004) 
  1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.516  0.890***  0.694*** 
 (0.422) (0.199) (0.230) 
Single plant -1.714 -0.716 -0.848 
 (1.109) (0.691) (0.523) 
U.K. ownership -0.196  2.797***  1.463** 
 (1.689) (0.719) (0.584) 
Family owned -3.259* -3.008*** -1.893*** 
 (1.773) (1.080) (0.614) 
Establishment age  1.291* -1.212*  0.170 
 (0.778) (0.674) (0.422) 
Occupation 1  0.586 -0.797 -0.612 
 (1.517) (0.994) (1.034) 
Occupation 2  0.594 -0.141 -0.461 
 (1.764) (1.211) (0.831) 
Occupation 3 -0.926 -1.079  0.790 
 (1.223) (1.200) (0.851) 
Occupation 4 1.998 -2.986***  0.521 
 (1.606) (1.123) (0.864) 
Occupation 5 -1.061 -0.72 -0.899 
 (1.884) (1.358) (1.055) 
Occupation 6 -0.274 -0.025 -0.327 
 (1.363) (0.829) (0.754) 
Occupation 7 -1.597  0.904  1.234 
 (1.808) (0.765) (0.797) 
Female workers  0.029  0.004  0.017 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.012) 
Part-time workers -0.003  0.003  0.006 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Fixed-term workers -0.095 -0.007 -0.117 
 (0.666) (0.574) (0.486) 
Local market  3.088***  0.567  1.631*** 
 (1.151) (0.760) (0.518) 
JCC -0.414  0.726  1.326*** 
 (0.657) (0.645) (0.480) 
Team work -0.287 -0.24 -0.177 
 (0.757) (0.519) (0.420) 
No. of contingent pay practices 
-0.179 -0.527* -0.27 
 (0.268) (0.298) (0.186) 
London -33.969*** -1.612** -1.044* 
 (0.875) (0.696) (0.579) 
66 
Constant -6.958** -6.967*** -6.594*** 
 (2.921) (1.476) (1.419) 
Pseudo R2  0.45 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also 
notes to Table 11. 
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Table 13 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 1998-2004 
(reference category is no collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 
 
1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.696***  0.058  0.744*** 
 (0.228) (0.380) (0.206) 
Single plant -1.039  0.495 -0.881 
 (0.706) (0.542) (0.621) 
U.K. ownership  0.024  1.348* -0.117 
 (0.896) (0.720) (0.465) 
Family owned  0.427 -1.249* -0.813 
 (0.680) (0.685) (0.649) 
Establishment age  0.382 -0.894  0.110 
 (0.513) (0.608) (0.405) 
Occupation 1 -2.076  0.222  2.001 
 (1.297) (0.932) (1.395) 
Occupation 2  0.055 -0.843  0.550 
 (1.143) (1.040) (0.897) 
Occupation 3  0.263 -0.206  0.902 
 (1.120) (0.928) (0.770) 
Occupation 4  1.148  0.585  0.158 
 (1.175) (0.886) (0.929) 
Occupation 5 -1.824 -2.451**  1.107 
 (1.135) (1.129) (1.129) 
Occupation 6  1.001  1.202 -0.197 
 (0.966) (0.865) (0.850) 
Occupation 7  1.855  0.518  1.189 
 (1.236) (0.888) (0.858) 
Female workers  0.008 -0.007 -0.028** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Part-time workers  0.013 -0.022  0.047*** 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) 
Fixed-term workers -0.217 0.476 -0.135 
 (0.599) (0.567) (0.436) 
Local market  1.719***  1.520**  0.795 
 (0.532) (0.698) (0.583) 
JCC  1.425*** -0.099  1.200*** 
 (0.526) (0.541) (0.427) 
Team work  0.687  0.067 -0.231 
 (0.546) (0.643) (0.438) 
No. of contingent pay practices 
-0.504** -0.733*** -0.241 
 (0.242) (0.267) (0.206) 
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London -2.392*** -2.430*** -1.538** 
 (0.687) (0.913) (0.653) 
Constant -6.183*** -2.046 -6.598*** 
 (1.778) (2.175) (1.414) 
Pseudo R2 0.37 
n 572 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also 
notes to Table 11. 
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Table 14 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Sectoral Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no sectoral collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.170 -0.667  1.117*** 
 (0.316) (0.565) (0.406) 
Single plant -2.018*  0.732 -0.786 
 (1.166) (0.714) (1.032) 
U.K. ownership  0.570  0.645  0.310 
 (1.788) (1.221) (1.390) 
Family owned  0.493 -0.834 -0.994 
 (0.806) (0.768) (0.955) 
Establishment age  0.060 -0.664  0.235 
 (0.838) (0.597) (0.716) 
Occupation 1 -4.477***  3.102**  2.618 
 (1.723) (1.238) (1.911) 
Occupation 2 -0.029  1.956  0.099 
 (1.226) (1.434) (2.517) 
Occupation 3  0.619 -0.144 -31.056*** 
 (0.994) (1.131) (1.158) 
Occupation 4 -0.546 -0.819 -1.427 
 (1.015) (1.361) (1.846) 
Occupation 5 -5.484*** -3.797  0.494 
 (1.631) (2.598) (1.654) 
Occupation 6 -0.017  0.143 -32.278*** 
 (1.142) (1.064) (1.893) 
Occupation 7 -2.067*  0.048  0.908 
 (1.174) (1.142) (1.571) 
Female workers  0.009 -0.049** -0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.019) 
Part-time workers  0.021  0.057**  0.021 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.022) 
Fixed-term workers  0.181  1.211 -0.791 
 (0.863) (0.923) (1.326) 
Local market  1.032  2.224**  0.397 
 (0.723) (0.973) (1.230) 
JCC  0.422  0.169 -1.684* 
 (0.829) (0.700) (0.907) 
Team work  1.510* -0.441 -0.707 
 (0.900) (0.719) (0.864) 
No. of contingent pay practices 
-1.003** -0.707** -1.189** 
 (0.450) (0.285) (0.574) 
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London -2.387** -2.517** -33.21*** 
 (1.077) (1.104) (1.925) 
Sic1  2.222  4.768* -0.416 
 (1.550) (2.508) (1.149) 
Sic2  3.981***  6.535***  3.788*** 
 (1.391) (2.468) (1.187) 
Sic3 -1.339  2.919 -33.047*** 
 (1.350) (1.882) (1.047) 
Sic4 -34.897***  2.906** -33.338*** 
 (1.035) (1.227) (0.956) 
Sic5 -3.021  6.036** -33.538*** 
 (2.236) (2.580) (1.391) 
Sic6  1.437  7.937*** -28.889*** 
 (1.586) (2.619) (2.996) 
Sic7 -1.743  3.176** -2.846* 
 (1.132) (1.558) (1.682) 
Constant -5.283** -4.857** -5.647** 
 (2.272) (2.265) (2.276) 
Pseudo R2 0.44 
n 566 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. SIC variables are the standard industry classification codes as 
follows. Sic1: Manufacture and Utilities; Sic2: Construction; Sic3: Wholesale and Retail; Sic4: 
Hotels and Restaurants; Sic5: Transport and Communication; Sic6: Financial Services; Sic7: 
Other business services. The Sic reference category is Education, Health, and Other Community 
Services. See also notes to Table 11 
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Table 15 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Firm Collective Bargaining Status, Great Britain, 1998-
2004 (reference category is no firm collective bargaining in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.616***  0.418  0.968*** 
 (0.234) (0.309) (0.203) 
Single plant -0.865  0.411 -1.820*** 
 (0.564) (0.590) (0.697) 
U.K. ownership -0.202  0.882 -0.459 
 (0.602) (0.647) (0.471) 
Family owned  0.073 -1.331* -0.279 
 (0.733) (0.696) (0.688) 
Establishment age  0.371 -0.799  0.685 
 (0.560) (0.546) (0.499) 
Occupation 1 -0.427 -1.432  1.079 
 (1.623) (1.107) (1.016) 
Occupation 2  0.116 -1.822*  0.000 
 (1.506) (0.951) (0.870) 
Occupation 3 -0.596 -0.312  0.812 
 (1.126) (0.986) (0.821) 
Occupation 4  1.781  0.049  0.498 
 (1.256) (0.768) (1.031) 
Occupation 5  0.745 -2.377  0.678 
 (1.279) (1.458) (1.087) 
Occupation 6  0.801 -0.909 -0.462 
 (0.938) (0.922) (1.179) 
Occupation 7  3.383***  0.164  1.416* 
 (1.280) (0.861) (0.757) 
Female workers -0.010  0.006 -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) 
Part-time workers  0.036* -0.029*  0.025* 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) 
Fixed-term workers -1.037** -0.855  0.375 
 (0.474) (0.546) (0.480) 
Local market  1.390** -0.007  0.491 
 (0.642) (0.641) (0.580) 
JCC  1.212**  0.531  1.768*** 
 (0.556) (0.478) (0.434) 
Team work  0.198  0.824 -0.839** 
 (0.490) (0.600) (0.406) 
No. of contingent pay practices  0.232 -0.188  0.146 
 (0.259) (0.221) (0.217) 
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London -2.375*** -2.174** -0.342 
 (0.841) (1.001) (0.611) 
Constant -7.026*** -2.590 -7.811*** 
 (1.932) (2.316) (1.273) 
Pseudo R2 0.39 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also 
notes to Table 11. 
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Table 16 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Joint Consultative Committee Status, Great Britain, 
1998-2004 (reference category is no JCC in 1998 and 2004) 
 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size -0.027  0.213  0.522** 
 (0.302) (0.226) (0.251) 
Single plant -1.154* -0.843* -2.420*** 
 (0.668) (0.502) (0.574) 
U.K. ownership  0.111 -2.163***  0.014 
 (0.642) (0.572) (0.542) 
Family owned -1.046** -1.372** -2.657*** 
 (0.502) (0.574) (0.577) 
Establishment age -0.662 -1.818***  0.224 
 (0.492) (0.489) (0.463) 
Occupation 1  0.804 -0.855  0.262 
 (1.140) (0.897) (0.943) 
Occupation 2  1.358 -1.734 -0.659 
 (1.006) (1.393) (0.986) 
Occupation 3  0.775 -1.083  0.571 
 (0.981) (0.728) (0.782) 
Occupation 4  1.179 -0.273  0.894 
 (0.876) (0.890) (0.834) 
Occupation 5  1.031 -1.62 -0.768 
 (0.958) (1.001) (0.829) 
Occupation 6 -0.216 -0.158  1.455* 
 (1.012) (0.752) (0.780) 
Occupation 7 -0.747 -0.01 -0.039 
 (0.875) (0.803) (0.660) 
Female workers -0.018  0.015 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) 
Part-time workers  0.017 -0.017 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Fixed-term workers  0.455 -0.429 -0.427 
 (0.571) (0.540) (0.537) 
Local market -1.418** -0.225 -0.527 
 (0.699) (0.530) (0.489) 
Union recognition  1.019*  1.012*  1.537*** 
 (0.610) (0.605) (0.497) 
Team work -0.281  0.180 -0.228 
 (0.569) (0.467) (0.507) 
No. of contingent pay practices 
 0.328  0.001  0.069 
 (0.263) (0.180) (0.190) 
London -0.869 -0.071 -0.022 
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 (0.890) (0.603) (0.758) 
Constant  0.052  2.582*  0.190 
 (1.973) (1.385) (1.700) 
Pseudo R2 0.31 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies. See also 
notes to Table 11 for a description of all other regressors; the only difference here is the inclusion 
of union recognition (a 1/0 dummy for the presence of a recognized union) and the excision of 
JCC. 
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Table 17 
Multinomial Logit Estimates for Workplace-level Joint Consultative Committee Status, 
Great Britain, 1998-2004 (reference category is no workplace JCC in 1998 and 2004) 
 1998 only 2004 only 1998 and 2004 
Log establishment size  0.893***  1.169***  1.495*** 
 (0.222) (0.200) (0.214) 
Single plant  0.528 -0.264  0.396 
 (0.621) (0.497) (0.552) 
U.K. ownership -0.56 -0.635  0.459 
 (0.580) (0.485) (0.533) 
Family owned  0.121 -0.643 -1.627** 
 (0.498) (0.487) (0.696) 
Establishment age  0.035 -0.573  0.140 
 (0.454) (0.444) (0.472) 
Occupation 1  2.733**  0.289 -0.601 
 (1.105) (0.731) (0.922) 
Occupation 2  1.587 -1.232 -0.712 
 (1.198) (1.139) (0.814) 
Occupation 3  1.896*  0.196  0.784 
 (1.107) (0.652) (0.831) 
Occupation 4  1.896*  0.007  1.052 
 (1.028) (0.683) (0.814) 
Occupation 5  0.721 -1.125 -2.004** 
 (1.243) (0.815) (1.008) 
Occupation 6 -0.364 -1.181  1.340 
 (1.690) (0.742) (0.943) 
Occupation 7 0.487 -0.78  0.189 
 (1.005) (0.653) (0.687) 
Female workers -0.006 -0.01 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.011) 
Part-time workers  0.018  0.001 -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) 
Fixed-term workers  0.285 -0.405  0.714 
 (0.511) (0.383) (0.481) 
Local market -1.765*** -1.002** -0.738 
 (0.612) (0.452) (0.473) 
Union recognition  0.301  0.262 -0.106 
 (0.520) (0.456) (0.448) 
Team work  0.147  0.352  0.510 
 (0.481) (0.387) (0.434) 
No. of contingent pay practices 
 0.107  0.242 -0.013 
 (0.227) (0.193) (0.208) 
London -0.895  0.141  1.095** 
 (0.999) (0.538) (0.556) 
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Constant -5.802*** -3.693*** -7.176*** 
 (1.944) (1.144) (1.366) 
Pseudo R2 0.25 
n 584 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include 8 single-digit industry dummies and a 
constant. See also notes to Table 11 for a description of all other regressors; the only difference 
here is the inclusion of union recognition (a 1/0 dummy for the presence of a recognized union) 
and the excision of JCC 
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Figure 1 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Establishments in Germany, 
1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
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Figure 2 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Employees in Germany, 
1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section weighted data) 
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Figure 3 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Establishments in Germany, 
Permanent Stayers, 1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
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Figure 4 
The Collective Bargaining and Works Council Coverage of Employees in Germany, 
Permanent Stayers, 1998-2004 (establishments with at least 5 employees, cross-section 
weighted data) 
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Appendix Table 1 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample, Germany 
 
Variable Type Mean  S. D. n 
Any type of collective agreement Dummy 0.685 0.465 1,747 
Sectoral (i.e.multi-employer) collective agreement Dummy 0.583 0.493 1,747 
Firm-level collective agreement Dummy 0.102 0.303 1,747 
Introduction of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.142 0.349 550 
Introduction of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.133 0.340 728 
Introduction of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.043 0.202 1,569 
Abolition of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.190 0.382 1,197 
Abolition of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.216 0.412 1,019 
Abolition of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.522 0.500 178 
Works council presence Dummy 0.431 0.495 1,747 
Introduction of a works council between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.038 0.192 994 
                                  Abolition of a works council between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.076 0.265 753 
Establishment size (total number of employees; as of June30, 1998) log value 4.093 1.692 1,747 
Increasing sales expected Dummy 0.339 0.474 1,737 
High-tech (technology of equipment is high/very high) Dummy 0.026 0.159 1,745 
Delegation (of responsibilities to lower levels during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.288 0.453 1,731 
Team-work (introduction of team-work during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.224 0.417 1,731 
Profit-center (introduction of profit center during the last 24 months) Dummy 0.156 0.363 1,731 
 R&D (establishment or another unit within company is engaged in R&D) Dummy 0.260 0.439 1,744 
Skilled workers Proportion 65.203 26.840 1,746 
Female workers Proportion 35.820 29.226 1,742 
Part-time workers Proportion 13.870 20.966 1,741 
Fixed-term contract workers Proportion 3.929 9.878 1,741 
Legal form: individually-owned firm Dummy 0.198 0.399 1,736 
       Single establishment (independent company with no other place of business Dummy 0.722 0.448 1,744 
Age of establishment (founded before 1990) Dummy 0.539 0.499 1,743 
Exports Proportion 8.541 19.328 1,701 
Foreign property (foreign majority ownership [taken from 2004 data]} Dummy 0.083 0.276 1,725 
Presence of profit sharing schemes (in 1998) Dummy 0.157    0.364    1,747 
High competition (pressure from competition is ‘substantial’[in 1998]) Dummy 0.656  0.475  1,747 
West Germany (establishment located in western Germany) Dummy 0.463 0.499 1,747 
Industry dummies (32) Dummy 
- - 1,747 
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Appendix Table 2 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics of the Estimation Sample, Great Britain 
Variable Type Mean  S. D. n 
Any union recognition Dummy 0.380 0.486 587 
Any type of collective agreement Dummy 0.341 0.475 577 
Sectoral (i.e.multi-employer) collective agreement Dummy 0.071 0.257 580 
Firm-level collective agreement Dummy 0.271 0.445 587 
Introduction of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.075 0.264 587 
Abolition of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.031 0.173 587 
Retention of union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.349 0.477 587 
No union recognition between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.545 0.498 587 
Introduction of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.101 0.302 574 
Abolition of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.124 0.330 574 
Retention of a collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.218 0.413 574 
No  collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.558 0.497 574 
Introduction of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.055 0.227 568 
Abolition of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.049 0.217 568 
Retention of a sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.021 0.144 568 
No  sectoral collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.875 0.331 568 
Introduction of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.090 0.287 587 
Abolition of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.111 0.314 587 
Retention of a firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.160 0.367 587 
No  firm-level collective agreement between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.639 0.481 587 
Any joint consultative committee Dummy 0.521 0.450 587 
Introduction of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.181 0.385 587 
                                  Abolition of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.141 0.349 587 
Retention of a JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.380 0.486 587 
No  JCC  between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.298 0.458 587 
Any workplace JCC Dummy 0.346 0.477 587 
Introduction of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.179 0.384 587 
                                  Abolition of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.119 0.324 587 
Retention of a workplace JCC between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.227 0.419 587 
No  workplace JCC  between 1998 and 2004 Dummy 0.475 0.500 587 
Establishment size (total number of employees) Log value 4.726 1.212 587 
Team-work (60 percent or more of largest occupational group in teams) Dummy 0.652 0.477 587 
Percent female employees Percent 43.323 26.862 585 
Part-time workers Percent 21.361 27.058 585 
Any fixed-term or temporary contract workers Dummy 0.465 0.499 587 
       Single establishment (independent company with no other place of 
business) 
Dummy 0.273 0.446 587 
Age of establishment (founded before 1990) Dummy 0.356 0.479 587 
Market for main product/service is local Dummy 0.256 0.437 587 
U.K.-owned Dummy 0.768 0.422 587 
Family-owned Dummy 0.187 0.391 587 
Number of contingent pay schemes (share ownership, profit-related pay, 
deferred profit sharing, individual or group PBR, cash bonuses) 
Count 
(0,5) 
1.522 1.220 586 
London  (establishment located in London) Dummy 0.135 0.342 587 
Largest occupational group (8) Dummy 
  587 
Industry dummies (10) Dummy 
- - 587 
Note: Descriptive statistics are for 1998 baseline data, with the exception of switching status in 1998-2004  
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Appendix Table 3 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils in Germany, 1998-2004, 
Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees Establishments Employees 
1998 469,272 13,259,878 46,454 1,845,006 443,245 6,266,971 88,162 9,680,309 958,971 21,371,855 
48.9% 62.0% 4.8% 8.6% 46.2% 29.3% 9.2% 45.3%   
1999 453,854 12,667,567 28,870 1,687,144 459,346 6,660,295 88,850 9,648,126 942,070 21,015,006 
48.2% 60.3% 3.1% 8.0% 48.8% 31.7% 9.4% 45.9%   
2000 422,719 11,917,790 27,071 1,463,513 442,239 7,426,812 94,024 9,429,656 892,029 20,808,115 
47.4% 57.3% 3.0% 7.0% 49.6% 35.7% 10.5% 45.3%   
2001 400,009 11,805,583 29,086 1,664,439 430,685 7,089,134 89,922 9,536,473 859,780 20,559,156 
46.5% 57.4% 3.4% 8.1% 50.1% 34.5% 10.5% 46.4%   
2002 395,493 11,709,360 23,931 1,560,952 459,054 7,376,187 85,579 9,545,364 878,478 20,646,499 
45.0% 56.7% 2.7% 7.6% 52.3% 35.7% 9.7% 46.2%   
2003 377,128 11,439,852 25,392 1,673,711 471,057 7,508,745 79,948 9,310,295 873,577 20,622,308 
43.2% 55.5% 2.9% 8.1% 53.9% 36.4% 9.2% 45.1%   
2004 350,469 10,877,501 24,345 1,614,867 493,661 7,711,302 75,084 8,834,736 868,475 20,203,670 
40.4% 53.8% 2.8% 8.0% 56.8% 38.2% 8.6% 43.7%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 4 
Number of Employees and Establishments Not Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils but Acting upon a Collective 
Agreement, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Acting upon collective agreement  
Overall numbers  Yes  No  Totals  
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  
1999 205,905 3,265,817 239,557 3,194,755 445,462 6,460,572 942,070 21,015,006 
21.9% 15.5% 25.4% 15.2% 47.3% 30.7%   
2000 215,617 3,761,630 213,123 3,455,910 428,740 7,217,540 892,029 20,808,115 
24.2% 18.1% 23.9% 16.6% 48.1% 34.7%   
2001 192,599 3,517,545 207,954 3,097,784 400,553 6,615,329 859,780 20,559,156 
22.4% 17.1% 24.2% 15.1% 46.6% 32.2%   
2002 210,636 3,745,272 231,537 3,352,851 442,173 7,098,123 878,478 20,646,499 
24.0% 18.1% 26.4% 16.2% 50.3% 34.4%   
2003 232,241 3,820,184 213,870 3,245,989 446,111 7,066,173 873,577 20,622,308 
26.6% 18.5% 24.5% 15.7% 51.1% 34.3%   
2004 218,247 3,598,989 253,611 3,778,227 471,858 7,377,216 868,475 20,203,670 
25.1% 17.8% 29.2% 18.7% 54.3% 36.5%     
Note: Percentage values are based upon the overall number of establishments/employees. Because of missing values, the  totals of employers/employees are 
smaller compared with the total number of uncovered establishments/employees presented in Appendix Table 3. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations.
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Appendix Table 5 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils, 
Permanent Stayers, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status   
Works council  
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement  Firm agreement No agreement  
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  
1998 101,539 3,240,623 8,219 338,041 74,263 1,067,858 17,979 2,311,963 184,021 4,646,522 
55.2% 69.7% 4.5% 7.3% 40.4% 23.0% 9.8% 49.8%   
1999 89,075 2,947,818 4,429 236,590 80,336 1,192,041 17,619 2,241,176 173,840 4,376,449 
51.2% 67.4% 2.5% 5.4% 46.2% 27.2% 10.1% 51.2%   
2000 66,702 2,430,972 5,548 207,633 55,439 892,900 15,885 1,960,510 127,689 3,531,505 
52.2% 68.8% 4.3% 5.9% 43.4% 25.3% 12.4% 55.5%   
2001 56,516 2,159,535 4,476 263,964 49,862 837,889 13,768 1,830,756 110,854 3,261,388 
51.0% 66.2% 4.0% 8.1% 45.0% 25.7% 12.4% 56.1%   
2002 57,317 2,277,864 3,496 268,272 50,374 795,457 11,771 1,918,925 111,187 3,341,593 
51.6% 68.2% 3.1% 8.0% 45.3% 23.8% 10.6% 57.4%   
2003 53,374 2,293,113 2,808 273,965 51,508 816,232 13,398 2,029,893 107,690 3,383,310 
49.6% 67.8% 2.6% 8.1% 47.8% 24.1% 12.4% 60.0%   
2004 48,873 1,991,173 5,411 276,291 49,527 742,178 13,754 1,776,610 103,811 3,009,642 
47.1% 66.2% 5.2% 9.2% 47.7% 24.7% 13.2% 59.0%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 6 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils, 
Entrants, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  
1998 278,072 7,694,051 22,847 1,105,687 251,036 3,638,483 50,472 5,702,011 551,955 12,438,221 
50.4% 61.9% 4.1% 8.9% 45.5% 29.3% 9.1% 45.8%   
1999 101,031 2,479,482 7,792 275,098 102,509 1,481,099 17,017 1,713,606 211,332 4,235,679 
47.8% 58.5% 3.7% 6.5% 48.5% 35.0% 8.1% 40.5%   
2000 123,427 3,192,307 6,108 387,848 136,861 2,287,127 27,746 2,428,057 266,396 5,867,282 
46.3% 54.4% 2.3% 6.6% 51.4% 39.0% 10.4% 41.4%   
2001 75,202 1,981,450 7,051 335,458 98,157 1,546,608 15,382 1,678,426 180,410 3,863,516 
41.7% 51.3% 3.9% 8.7% 54.4% 40.0% 8.5% 43.4%   
2002 62,060 1,489,400 3,170 177,627 78,638 1,182,265 10,412 1,022,064 143,868 2,849,292 
43.1% 52.3% 2.2% 6.2% 54.7% 41.5% 7.2% 35.9%   
2003 58,150 1,292,368 5,670 221,410 94,789 1,294,635 12,463 901,964 158,609 2,808,413 
36.7% 46.0% 3.6% 7.9% 59.8% 46.1% 7.9% 32.1%   
2004 31,294 1,404,770 3,494 210,153 64,212 1,016,514 7,994 1,286,430 99,000 2,631,437 
31.6% 53.4% 3.5% 8.0% 64.9% 38.6% 8.1% 48.9%     
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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Appendix Table 7 
Number of Employees and Establishments Covered by Collective Agreements and Works Councils,  
Exits, Germany, 1998-2004, Weighted Data 
 
 Collective agreement status  
Works council 
 
Totals  Sectoral agreement Firm agreement No agreement 
Year  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  Establishments  Employees  
1998 89,660 2,325,204 15,389 401,278 117,945 1,560,630 19,756 1,666,335 222,994 4,287,112 
40.2% 54.2% 6.9% 9.4% 52.9% 36.4% 8.9% 38.9%   
1999 67,495 1,417,745 4,291 300,083 61,337 790,616 10,149 1,030,570 133,123 2,508,444 
50.7% 56.5% 3.2% 12.0% 46.1% 31.5% 7.6% 41.1%   
2000 43,843 1,047,473 4,503 166,125 48,014 793,086 96,360 2,006,684 96,360 2,006,684 
45.5% 52.2% 4.7% 8.3% 49.8% 39.5% 100.0% 100.0%   
2001 46,052 1,535,021 4,177 183,685 51,052 908,131 11,579 1,268,402 101,281 2,626,837 
45.5% 58.4% 4.1% 7.0% 50.4% 34.6% 11.4% 48.3%   
2002 56,401 1,521,910 8,032 293,909 65,879 984,222 16,283 1,351,303 130,312 2,800,041 
43.3% 54.4% 6.2% 10.5% 50.6% 35.2% 12.5% 48.3%   
2003 49,660 1,632,561 4,463 288,233 57,920 902,712 13,136 1,413,465 112,043 2,823,506 
44.3% 57.8% 4.0% 10.2% 51.7% 32.0% 11.7% 50.1%   
2004 44,482 1,119,542 2,308 197,490 69,510 878,276 7,584 932,824 116,300 2,195,308 
38.2% 51.0% 2.0% 9.0% 59.8% 40.0% 6.5% 42.5%     
Note: For each cross section we have two types of exit: exits of establishments populating the sample from earlier years and those establishments 
entering and leaving the sample in the given year. In 1998 we cannot distinguish the latter ‘mayflies’ from the former exits and therefore present 
the 1998 data in italics. 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 1998 to 2004, own calculations. 
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